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RECENT

CASES

ATTORNEY GENERAL-SUBPOENA POWER-No STATUTORY AuTHORITY TO COMPEL WITNESSES TO TESTIFY AT INVESTIGATION-Mar-

giotti, Attorney General of Pennsylvania under a Republican governor,
superseded the District Attorney of Allegheny County in the investigation
of alleged criminal acts by Democratic public employees in that county.
He issued a subpoena ordering defendants to appear at a "hearing" before
him and to give testimony affecting the "investigation," which was supplemental to a grand jury investigation then taking place. Defendants
refused to comply with the subpoena,' whereupon Margiotti filed a petition
to enforce compliance. In affirming the dismissal of the petition, the
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania held that the Attorney General had no
common law power to issue subpoenas and since the present proceeding
was an investigation, the statutory power to issue subpoenas when conducting a hearing was not applicable.2 Commonwealth ex rel. Margiotti
v. Orsini, 368 Pa. 259, 81 A.2d 891 (1951).
The instant case squarely presents the issue whether the Attorney
General acting without a grand jury in conducting an inquiry into alleged
criminal acts has the power to issue a subpoena. Precedent denied the
existence of an inherent common law power of subpoena in the Attorney
General. 8 This power, formerly an exclusively judicial power, may now
be exercised by administrative bodies where granted by statute.4 The only
express statutory authority relied on by the Attorney General was section
520 of the Administrative Code 5 which provides: "Every administrative
department . . . shall have the power to issue subpoenas, requiring

the attendance of witnesses and the production of books and papers
pertinent to any hearing before such department . . ."

The Attorney

General heads and acts for the Department of Justice," an administrative
department within the meaning of section 520. Section 904 of the Administrative Code imposes the duty on the Department of Justice to investigate any alleged violations of the laws of the Commonwealth and to
1. Orsini appeared, but on advice of counsel refused to testify. Price failed to
appear.
2. Although the Attorney General superseded the District Attorney, he thereby
gained no additional power to issue the subpoena which was not already conferred
by the Administrative Code. The Attorney General of Pennsylvania has been held
to have the power to supersede district attorneys in the investigation of crime. Appeal
of Margiotti, 365 Pa. 330, 75 A.2d 465 (1950), 99 U. OF PA. L. REv. 826 (1951).
3. Cf. Commonwealth v. Wilson, 158 Pa. Super. 198, 202, 44 A.2d 520, 521 (1945).
4. See FPC v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 304 U.S. 375 (1937) ; Jones v. SEC, 298
U.S. 1 (1936).
5. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 71, § 200 (Purdon 1942).
6. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 71, § 244 (Purdon 1942).
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take such steps as may be reasonably necessary to enforce such laws.7
Whether the Attorney General has statutory power to issue subpoenas
depends on (1) whether the particular action of the Attorney General
is a hearing or investigation, and (2) if the latter, whether the term
investigation as used in the Administrative Code includes hearings. A
judicial-type hearing involves the right to call witnesses, the right of
cross-examination, s a reasonable opportunity to learn and meet the claims
of the opposing party,9 and the receipt and weighing of evidence by the
trier of fact.' 0 There is a non-judicial type hearing as well, applying to
inquiries where there are no adversary proceedings, wherein the commission merely investigates and advises." An investigation, on the other
hand, has generally been considered a prior step to a judicial-type hearing,
in that it is conducted in order to determine whether the facts justify the
holding of a hearing.12 The Courts have recognized these distinctions.' 3
In the instant case the Attorney General's action was neither adjudication
nor rule making but could only be an investigation since he had no power
to indict.
The court reached its decision by concluding that an investigation
under section 904 does not include the power to conduct hearings under
section 520. Support for this position is found in statutes which expressly
confer upon the Attorney General the right to hold a hearing.14 The
legislature then, by omission, denied the power of subpoena to the Attorney
General when conducting an investigation. That this omission was intended
by the legislature, and not an oversight, is borne out by other statutes
in which an administrative agency is given only the power to investigate.
In every such instance the power of subpoena has been granted in express
terms.15
This decision in no way hampers the proper administration of justice
since the Attorney General may still obtain any necessary information by
presenting the matter to a grand jury, thus acquiring the necessary subpoena power.'0 In grand jury proceedings proper safeguards are imposed
7. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 71, § 294 (Purdon 1942).
8. See United States v. Appalachian Electric Power Co., 107 F.2d 769 (4th Cir.
1939).
9. Valley Mould and Iron Corp. v. NLRB, 116 F.2d 760 (7th Cir. 1940).
10. Cf. Morgan v. United States, 298 U.S. 468 (1936).
11. Cf. Norwegian Nitrogen Products Co. v. United States, 288 U.S. 294 (1933).
12. See In re Securities and Exchange Commission, 84 F.2d 316 (2d Cir. 1936).
13. Id. at 318.
14. E.g., PA. STAT. ANx. fit. 40, § 202 (Purdon 1930); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 71,
§ 733-504 (Purdon 1942).
15. E.g., Bar Association, PA. STAT. Axx. tit. 17, §'1665 (Purdon 1930); Motor
Vehicles Sales Finance Act, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 69, § 611(A), (B) (Purdon, Supp.
1950) ; Civil Service Commission, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53, §§ 13300.8-00.9 (Purdon,
Supp. 1950).
16. See Commonwealth v. Smith, 185 Pa. 553, 568, 40 AtI. 73, 75 (1898) ; Commonwealth ex rel. Fraley v. Rotan, 82 Pa. Super. 172, 175 (1923).
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for the protection of the accused. Testimony taken before the grand jury
is secret,' 7 and an innocent accused is not exposed to the danger of having
prejudicial coverage appear in the newspapers. The investigation by the
Attorney General, on the other hand, is not surrounded by the same safeguards. The court therefore properly prevented the Attorney General
from utilizing his power of investigation as a political tool to invoke unfavorable publicity against those elected public officials being investigated.
In the instant case criminal procedures were involved, whereas in those
instances where the Attorney General has been empowered by statute to
conduct hearings, they were not. Nor will a court convene a grand jury
in this blanket type of political investigation, 8 where the Attorney General
attempts to uncover criminal acts theretofore unknown to him.19 The
function of a grand jury is not to replace the police department in searching for criminal activities, but rather to investigate one or more alleged
criminal offenses brought to its attention. To have sustained the position
of the Attorney General, the court -would have been forced to make an
unprecedented extension of the subpoena power to a situation not protected
20
by the safeguards of criminal procedure.

CIVIL SERVICE-VETERANS

PREFERENCE AcT-STATUTORY PREFER-

ENCE OF WAR VETERANS FOR CIVIL SERVICE PROMOTIONS DECLARED UNCONSTITUTIONAL-A non-veteran took the same civil service examination

with certain war veterans for promotion to captain in a city fire department. The veterans received ten point credits on their passing scores
under the state's Veterans Preference Act,' and by virtue of these additional points were placed ahead of the non-veteran on the list of those
eligible for promotion. The veterans were consequently promoted to
captain, but the non-veteran was not. In a suit to oust the named veterans
from their promotions, the trial court found that the Act preferring
17. See Barnes v. State, 134 Tex. Crim. 461, 463, 116 S.W.2d 408, 409 (1938);

In re Gardiner, 64 N.Y. Supp. 760, 761 (1900).
18. See McNair's Petition, 324 Pa. 48, 61, 187 Atl. 498, 504 (1936). A grand
jury, however, will be called in investigations, although political, where criminal acts
threaten the public safety, or are of general concern. See Philadelphia Grand Jury
Investigation Case, 347 Pa. 316, 319, 32 A.2d 199, 201 (1943) ; Commonwealth ex rel.
Fraley v. Rotan, 82 Pa. Super. 172, 175 (1923).
19. In the instant case the Attorney General was conducting his own private
investigation to unearth previously undiscovered criminal acts beyond those which the
grand jury was then investigating. The Attorney General has been held to possess
this common law power to supersede or supplement the grand jury. See In re Dauphin
County Grand Jury Investigation (No. 1), 332 Pa. 289, 298, 2 A.2d 783, 788 (1939).
20. The force of this decision will not extend to other administrative agencies
with only the power of investigation, since every other such agency has been expressly
granted the use of the subpoena power. See note 15 supra.
1. Pa. Laws 1945, p. 837, § 3; PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 51, § 492.3 (Purdon, 1950).
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veterans in civil service promotions 2 was detrimental to the morale and
efficiency of the fire department, 3 but nevertheless held it constitutional.
On appeal, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court reversed, holding the Act
invalid as class legislation when applied to promotions, and ousted the
named veterans. Three judges dissented. Commonwealth ex rel. Maurer
to use of Braden v. O'Neill et al., 83 A.2d 382 (Sup. Ct., Pa., Sept. 24,
1951).
Preference for war veterans in public employment has been widely
enacted. It has generally not been based on an asserted power of the state
to hire whom it chooses, similar to the freedom of private employers.
In view of the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment 4 as
well as the prohibition against class legislation contained in many state
constitutions, 5 it is doubtful whether a state does possess such an unretricted power, at least when it states the qualifications for employment
in a statute.0 The propriety of veterans preference legislation has been
said, rather, to rise out of "the debt of gratitude that is due to the soldiers
and sailors of the nation for sacrifice and service," 7 and the bearing that
military training, discipline and experience has upon fitness for public
2. Until the Act of August 5, 1941,. P.L. 872, which amended the Act of June
27, 1939, P.L. 1198, Pennsylvania's veterans preference provisions applied only to
original appointments to the civil service. The Act of 1945, reviewed in the instant
case (see note 1 supra), followed the Act of 1941 in applying to both appointments
and promotions.
3. Introduced in evidence, without contradiction, were the following:
(1) testimony of a retired Chief Engineer (the highest position) of the fire
- department to the effect that the excessive mark-up given veterans made it almost
impossible for the older and more experienced men to obtain promotions, discouraged them, and definitely impaired the morale and efficiency of the fire department.
(2) testimony of a retired Deputy Chief Engineer (second highest position)
to the same effect.
(3) testimony of the present Director of Public Safety to the same effect.
(4) report of the Committee of Fifteen, an independent citizens group who
made a survey of various city departments, concluding that the morale of the fire
department (as well as the police department) was lowered because of the arbitrary
operation of the Veterans Preference Act.
(5) report by the National Fire Underwriters Association reducing Philadelphia to a fourth class city for the reason, among others, that the morale
of the city fire department was bad.
(6) statistics of the Civil Service Commission of Philadelphia revealing that
nine of the ten veterans here promoted had actually failed at least one of the
three main parts of the examination (general intelligence or practical questions,
but since their average scores were passing, they received the ten point bonus
under the Act), whereas the non-veteran had handily passed all three parts.
4. U.S. CoNsT. AMEND. XIV, § 1: ". . . nor shall any State . . . deny to any
person . . . equal protection of the laws."

(Italics supplied.)

5. E.g., PA. CoNsT. Art. III, § 7: "The General Assembly shall
local or special law: . . . Granting to any corporation, association or
special or exclusive privilege or immunity. ...
6. See Note, 60 HAav. L. REV. 779 (1947) ; Powell, The Right to
State, 16 COL. L. REv. 99 (1916).
7. Cardozo, J., in Matter of Barthelmess v. Cukor, 231 N.Y. 435,
140, 143 (1921).

not pass any
individual any
Work for the
446, 132 N.E.
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service in civil life.8 In Pennsylvania, the first such statute was passed in
1887, when Civil War veterans who possessed the requisite qualifications
were to be preferred in public positions throughout the state.9 The preference was not always mandatory in its selection of veterans, as later statutes
sometimes expressed the preference by means of per centum credits on
civil service examinations.'0 The preference could not be exhibited in an
unlimited number of ways, however. At an early date a statutory provision
which exempted veterans (or their widows or children) from taking examinations for civil service positions was declared invalid as class legislation."' Although general classifications for special legislative purposes are
permissible,' 2 the constitutional prohibition against special laws has been
interpreted to mean that a legislative classification must have a reasonable
relation to a proper legislative purpose,' 3 and that distinctions on which the
classification is based must be necessary,' 4 genuine and substantial. 15 The
classification of war veterans for preference over non-veterans in appointments to civil service positions was found reasonable in Commonwealth ex
rel. Graham v. Schmid,16 but only if the veterans were able to show by
successfully passing the examination that they had the minimum qualifications to perform the official duties. In holding the statutory provision valid
8. See Opinion of the Justices, 324 Mass. 736, 740, 85 N.E.2d 238, 243 (1949);
accord, Cook v. Mason, 103 Cal. App. 6, 11, 283 Pac. 891, 893 (1929). Sec. 2 of the
Pennsylvania Act challenged in the instant case states that credit shall be given the
veteran "for the discipline and experience represented by his military training and for
the loyality and public spirit demonstrated by his service for the preservation of his
country." PA. STAT. ANNq. tit. 51, § 492.2 (Pardon 1950). A third reason sometimes
given is "a public purpose to promote patriotism." E.g., Goodrich v. Mitchell, 68 Kan.
765, 772, 75 N.E. 1034, 1036 (1904).
9. Pa. Laws 1887, p.13 2 , No. 75, § 1.
10. Pa. Laws 1923, p. 203, No. 150, §§ 1, 2.
11. Wood v. Philadelphia, 46 Pa. Super. 573 (1911). The Iowa Supreme Court,
in holding a tax exemption for veterans an unconstitutional classification, has said:
"Equity in right, privilege, burdens, and protection is the thought running through
the constitution and laws of the state; and an act intentionally and necessarily creating
inequality therein, based on no reason suggested by necessity or difference in condition
or circumstances, is opposed to the spirit of free government, and expressly prohibited
by the constitution. If the ultimate object of this section [prohibiting class legislation]
was, as suggested, to prevent the separation of society into classes or castes such as
exist in other lands, it may not be amiss to observe that these, in large part, had
their origin in the honors and emoluments bestowed because of achievements in arms
and military service." State v. Gabroski, 111 Iowa 496, 501, 82 N.W. 959, 960 (1900).
12. See Seabolt v. Commissioners, 187 Pa. 319, 323, 41 Atl. 22, 23 (1898).
13. See Harris v. Board of Optometrical Examiners, 287 Pa. 531, 538, 135 At.
237, 240 (1926). Cf. American Sugar Refining Co. v. Louisiana, 179 U.S. 89, 92
(1900).
14. See Ayars' Appeal, 122 Pa. 266, 281, 16 Atl. 356, 363 (1889). Accord, Kurtz
v. Pittsburgh, 346 Pa. 362, 367, 31 A.2d 257, 258 (1943).
15. See Commonwealth v. Grossman, 248 Pa. 11, 15, 93 Atl. 781, 783 (1915).
Cf. Colgate v. Harvey, 296 U.S. 404 (1935), in which the Court said at 423: "The
classification, in order to avoid the constitutional prohibition [against a denial of the
equal protection of the laws] must be founded upon pertinent and real differences, as
distinguished from irrelevant and artificial ones. The test to be applied in such cases
as the present one is-does the statute arbitrarily and without genuine reason impose
a burden upon one group . . .from which it exempts another group, both of them
occupying substantially the same relation toward the subject matter of the legislation?
'Mere difference is not enough. .

..

16. 333 Pa. 568, 3 A.2d 701 (1938).

'
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which granted a fifteen per cent credit on the veterans' passing scores, the
court laid down the test of reasonable relation between the basis of preference of veterans and the proper performance of public duties.17 The court
in the same decision declared a statutory provision void that granted veterans additional credits even if they did not pass the examination, since
it gave undue weight to the military and public experience of veterans, and
thus constituted an exclusive privilege.' 8
The instant case presents a situation factually different from the Schmid
case, for here the examinees applied for promotion rather than original
appointment. The court distinguished it on this basis. The difference is
significant in that public policy considerations on which a veteran might
be employed in public service are not necessarily those on which he should
be advanced. The significance for constitutional purposes lies in the fact
that the relation between military service and a civil service job becomes
at least one step more remote when the civil service job is gained through
promotion rather than through initial appointment. Thus, the possibility
of disproving the reasonableness and substantiality of the assumed relation
is that much increased. 19 Preference for veterans applying initially as
hosemen in the fire department presumably bears some reasonable relation
to the experience the veteran has gained in military service, but when applying for promotion, the relevancy of military experience to the proper performance of a fire captain appears considerably less and entirely subordinate
to merit in the department. The necessity of aiding large numbers of discharged servicemen to re-enter civilian employment, the public recognition
given to those who have been called to armed defense of the nation, and
the special qualifications for performing public duties (such as firemen)
that derive from military service, all indicate that the classification of
veterans for preference in public employment is based on genuine distinctions and that its purpose is proper. But the preference may be carried
too far and achieve an unreasonable effect. Although legislation must be
unreasonable, not merely unwise, before a court will strike it down, the evidence at trial clearly established that the Act was creating a special class
within the fire department 2 0-the veterans whose chances for advancement,
irrespective of merit, greatly outweighed those of the non-veterans. This
17. ". . . there must be some reasonable relation between the basis of preference
and the object to be obtained, the preference of veterans for the proper performance
of public duties. Public policy, as well as constitutional restrictions, prohibits an
unrestrained preference as it does a preference credit based on factors not representative ot true value." Id. at 573, 3 A.2d at 704.
18. Id. at 580, 3 A.2d at 707.
19. See Note, 49 H.Av. L. REv. 631 (1936) ; BWI6, Questions of Fact Affecting
Constitutionality, 38 HARv. L. REv. 6 (1924). Although "constitutional facts," historically, were first presented at the appellate level by means of judicial notice, and
although they have been most often used to uphold the constitutionality of controversial
statutes, there is no sound reason why such facts could not better be presented at trial
when the statute is directly challenged in the complaint, and be used to invalidate rather
than uphold the constitutionality of the statute. Compare Muller v. Oregon, 208 U.S.
412 (1908) ("Brandeis brief"), with the instant case.
20. See note 3 supra.
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was a class artificial to the business of fighting fires and detrimental to
the public safety and welfare. Because of the evidence used here, the
Pennsylvania court was able to mark one point where legislative gratitude
to veterans exceeded constitutional limits and became injurious to other
public interests. When other jurisdictions recently reviewed the con21
they neither drew
stitutionality of -veterans preference for promotions,
a distinction between promotions and original appointments, 22 nor were
they presented with evidence to establish that the preference had a detrimental effect upon the performance of public service. These were just the
factors considered in the instant case, making it unique in the field and
placing Pennsylvania alone in judicially invalidating veterans preference
for promotion.

EMINENT

DOMAIN-THE

EXTENT

TO WHICH

THE VALUE OF A

RANCH WILL BE CONSIDERED TO BE ENHANCED BY THE OWNER THEREOF

DOMAIN-The Constitution of the United States provides that the government shall not take
private property for public use without just compensation., Just compen2
sation has been held to be market value at the time and place of the taking.
The courts have ruled that the jury, when fixing market value, cannot consider the effect of the proposed project upon the land to be taken.3 Although
the rule has been stated in these general terms, all the cases on point have
dealt with the situation where the project has caused an increase in the
value of the land to be taken. 4 The rule that the effect of the project should
not be considered in fixing fair value is based upon two considerations.
First, since the land is to be taken for the project, it can never by any
possibility either suffer from or enjoy the effects of the project. 5 Second,
the law should not require the government to pay anything for the enHOLDING A PERMIT TO GRAZE UPON THE PUBLIC

21.
Marsh,
People
22.
(1946)
statute

Opinion of the Justices, 324 Mass. 736, 85 N.E.2d 238 (1949); Bateman v.
64 N.Y.S.2d 678 (1946), aff'd, 296 N.Y. 849, 72 N.E.2d 30 (1947). See
ex rel. Hurley v. Graher, 405 Ill. 331, 352, 90 N.E.2d 763, 774 (1950).
But cf. MacCarthy v. Director of Civil Service, 319 Mass. 124, 64 N.E.2d 617
(distinction drawn to deny disabled veteran preference for promotion where
denoted only "appointment").

1. U.S. CONST. AMEND. V.
2. E.g., United States v. Miller, 317 U.S. 369 (1943) ; Danforth v. United States,
308 U.S. 271 (1939); United States v. Chandler-Dunbar Co., 229 U.S. 53 (1913).
3. United States v. Miller, 317 U.S. 369 (1943); Kerr v. South Park Commissioners, 117 U.S. 379 (1886) ; John L. Roper Lumber Co. v. United States, 150 F.2d
329 (4th Cir. 1945) ; Phillips v. United States, 148 F.2d 714 (2d Cir. 1945) ; Murray
v. United States, 130 F.2d 442 (D.C. Cir. 1942).
4. Lewis Orgel, when commenting on this phenomenon, observes that one authority
(Nichols) attributes the lack of cases on the converse point to a general recognition
of the injustice of permitting a public authority to depreciate property values by a
threat to erect an offensive structure and then take advantage of this depression in the
price when condemning the land. ORGEL, VALUATION UNDER EMINENT DOMAIN 351
(1936).
5. 1 NIcHoLs, EMINENT DOMAIN 675 (2d ed. 1917).
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hancement in the value of the property due either to knowledge that this
particular piece of land was needed, or to a general rise in the value of lands
in the area because of the desirability of the proposed project. The courts
have permitted the jury to consider the effect of the project upon the
value of the land to be taken only where the project was maintained for
some time and an expansion later required. Even in this situation the
effect of the project may be considered only if the land being taken was
not within the bounds of the project as originally planned. 6
In the early days of western migration the government owned vast
tracts of land which ranchers were permitted to use for grazing. There arose
an implied license that these lands might be used for this purpose so long
as the government did not withdraw its consent. The right to graze upon
the unoccupied public domain was recognized by the courts in suits between
private parties. 7 This implied license, however, created no right in the
ranchers as against the United States, and the government could restrict or
prohibit the use of the public domain. 8 This was the state of the law when
Congress passed the Taylor Grazing Act in 1934. 9 That Act provided for
the issuance by the Secretary of the Interior of licenses permitting grazing
upon the public domain, and that such grazing privileges should be adequately safeguarded, but declared that the permit to graze created no right,
title, interest, or estate in the lands. These grazing permits raised an eminent domain problem when the government decided to take several hundred
thousand acres of land in New Mexico for defense purposes. Most of the
land within the proposed project was federally owned, but pursuant to the
Taylor Act had been licensed to ranchers owning adjacent property. The
government filed a petition to condemn that land within the area which was
held in fee simple by the ranchers. Since a prior decision 10 had held that
the use of the public domain for grazing is a privilege which is withdrawable
at any time for any use by the sovereign without payment of compensation, the ranchers in the instant cases admitted that they had no compensable interest in the public lands by virtue of their permits to graze thereon,"
but requested and received an instruction in the district court that the jury
might, when determining the value of the fee, take into consideration the
6. Phillips v. United States, 148 F.2d 714 (2d Cir. 1945) ; Scott v. United States,

146 F.2d 131 (5th Cir. 1944).
7. Buford v. Houtz, 133 U.S. 320 (1890).

8. United States v. Grimoud, 220 U.S. 506 (1911).

9. 48 STAT. 1270 (1934), 43 U.S.C. §315 (1946), as amended, 49 STAT. 1976
(1936), 56 STAT. 654 (1942).
10. Osborne v. United States, 145 F.2d 892 (9th Cir. 1944).
11. Brief for Appellees, p. 3, United States v. Cox, 190 F.2d 303 (10th Cir. 1951).

The only compensation that the ranchers could receive for the loss of the licensed land
is that allowed by the 1942 amendment to the Taylor Act. This amendment provides
that where national defense requires the taking of lands for which grazing permits
have been issued, the head of the department taldng.such lands shall determine what
is a fair price for the loss suffered by such permit holders. "Such payments shall be
deemed payment in full for such losses. Nothing herein contained shall be construed

to create any liability not now existing against the United States."
(1942), 43 U.S.C. §315q (1946).

56

STAT.

654
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extent to which the accessibility and availability of the permit lands enhanced the value of the fee. In every case the jury rendered a substantial
verdict in favor of the ranchers. The government appealed and the circuit
court rendered two decisions. One dealt with those cases in which the proposed project was to include both the fee owned by the ranchers and the
federal lands licensed by him. There the court held that in evaluating the
fee, the jury could not consider the availability and accessibility of the
federal lands for grazing purposes. United States v. Cox, 190 F.2d 293
(10th Cir.), cert. denied, 20 U.S.L. WEEK 3116 (U.S. 1951). In United
States v. Jaramillo, 190 F.2d 303 (10th Cir. 1951), the court ruled that the
availability and accessibility of the federal lands could be considered in
fixing the value of the fee, if the project for which the fee was taken did
2
not include the licensed land.'
In the Cox case it is apparent that the court declined to apply the
general rule that the effect of the proposed project may not be considered
in evaluating the land condemned. As heretofore applied, the rule has
served to deny to the owner compensation for any speculative increase in
value due to the project; thus the property is valued as of the time of
condemnation. The Cox case involved the converse situation, i.e., assuming the accessibility to the licensed lands was part of the value of the fee,
the effect of the proposed project would be a decrease in the fee value
since those licensed lands were part of the land condemned. If the general
rule had been applied, the value of the fee would include the availability
of the licensed lands since that was part of the value at the time of condemnation. Several considerations support the court's deviation from the
general rule. First, that rule arose out of a desire to protect the government from paying for the value which it had created by undertaking the
project. In the Cox case the rule, if applied, would have increased the cost
to the government. Second, it was the government's own action, in
granting the permit, which had originally enhanced the value of the fee.
Third, the permit was by its terms revocable at will and could have been
revoked without compensation, independent of the eminent domain action;
therefore the termination of the privilege coincident with the taking of the
fee by eminent domain should not influence the price to be paid for the
land. But if the court based its holding in the Cox case upon the unique
nature of the grazing permits, then it should have reached a result contra
to that which it actually reached in the Jaramillo case. Which case gives
the more desirable result depends largely upon the weight to be accorded
to the fact that the ranchers have developed the water supply and other
facilities upon the fee with reference to the well-established government
policy of permitting grazing upon the public domain. Also, when determining the value of a given fee it has been the business practice in the area
to consider the amount of public domain available to the owner of said fee. 13
12. The circuit court, while affirming on this point, reversed the district court on
another issue and remanded the case for a new trial.
13. United States v. Cox, at 295.

RECENT CASES
Although the court in the instant cases could not have based their decision

in both cases upon the peculiar nature of the license, it seems that the
grazing permits created a situation sufficiently unique that these cases will
not be made the basis of a rule which would prohibit the jury from considering the extent to which the property being taken has been enhanced
by an existing government use, if that use is to be displaced by the new
project.

FERAL

JRSDIcTION-JOINDER

OF

"SuBsTANTIAL"

FEDERAL

PATENT OR COPYRIGHT CLAIM AND "RELATED" NON-FEDEA L CLAIM OF

UNFAIR CoMP-TTioN-Federal jurisdiction over non-federal claims has
been a source of contention in the federal courts for more than fifteen years.
Two recent cases in the Second Circuit, Kleinnan v. Betty Dair Creations1
and Schreyer v. Casco Products Corp.,2 indicate that the confusion has
not ended. Although both cases involved similar fact situations, they were
decided oppositely. In the Kleinman case, one New York citizen sued another for infringement of a patented removable shoulder-pad in a federal
district court. He joined with this federal claim a non-federal one charging,
in substance, that he bad revealed his patented device to defendant for the
purpose of entering into an arrangement for royalties, that the revelations
were made in confidence, and that defendant had used plaintiff's ideas but
had refused to pay him. The district court dismissed the complaint, finding the patent invalid for want of invention and also finding that it had no
jurisdiction over the second claim in the absence of diversity of citizenship.
Plaintiff, in his appeal, contended that his second claim was one of unfair
competition and that the lower court had jurisdiction by virtue of § 1338(b)
of the Judicial Code.' The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the
second claim sounded primarily in contract and that § 1338(b) was therefore inapplicable. The Schreyer case was decided a few months later.
Again, there was no diversity between parties. Plaintiff stated two causes
of action: a federal claim for infringement of a patented electric steam
ironer and a non-federal one charging, in substance, that plaintiff had
negotiated with defendant for the manufacture and sale of the patented
ironer, and that the latter had used the disclosures, made in confidence,
to his own advantage. The district court, terming the second claim one
of "unfair competition," took jurisdiction of it under § 1338(b) and awarded
damages. 4 The Court of Appeals held the patent invalid but affirmed the
judgment as to unfair competition.
1. 189 F.2d 546 (2d Cir. 1951).
2. 190 F.2d 921 (2d Cir. 1951).
3. 28 U.S.C. § 1338(b) (Supp.

1950) : "The district courts shall have original
jurisdiction of any civil action asserting a claim of unfair competition when joined
with a substantial and related claim under the copyright, patent or trademark laws."
4. 88 F. Supp. 637 (S.D. N.Y. 1950).
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In 1933, in the case of Hum v. Oursler,5 and later in another case,0
the Supreme Court ruled that where the facts of a non-federal claim joined
with a federal claim were "substantially identical," a Federal District Court
had jurisdiction over the non-federal claim. The Second Circuit, emphasizing language in the Hum case, 7 limited the application of the Hum rule
by holding that (1) there had to be identical facts in both claims resulting
in substantial identity of proof; 8 (2) the federal courts had no jurisdiction
over non-federal claims of unfair competition occurring before registration
of the patent or copyright. 9 These restrictive requirements were the subject of much criticism. 10 Section 1338(b) was enacted primarily to offset
the Second Circuit's narrow interpretation of the Humn rule.'1 It has been
recognized that § 1338(b), with respect to joinder of federal patent claims
and non-federal unfair competition claims, is broader than its own previous interpretation.' 2
The conflict between the two instant cases suggests that the limitation
of the scope of § 1338(b) to non-federal claims of unfair competition was
unfortunate, since unfair competition is at present so elusive a concept. The
line of demarcation between a breach of contract or licensing agreement
and the tort of appropriating confidential information is often blurred.13
The raison d'Otre of the Hum rule and § 1338(b) is judicial economy and
convenience, and the prevention of "piecemeal litigation." 14 Against these
objectives stand the arguments against federal assumption of jurisdiction
over non-federal claims: the federal courts should not decide important
matters of state policy or politically explosive cases traditionally left to
the states,' 5 and the federal dockets in many places are already over5. 289 U.S. 238 (1933).
6. Armstrong Paints & Varnish Works v. Nu-Enamel Corp., 305 U.S. 315 (1938).
7. Hum v. Oursler, supra note 5, at 246: "The claims of infringement and unfair
competition so precisely rest upon identical facts as to be little more than different
epithets to characterize the same group of circumstances."
8. Musher Foundation v. Alba Trading Co., 127 F.2d 9 (2d Cir. 1942).
9. Treasure Imports v. Henry Amdur and Sons, 127 F.2d 3 (2d Cir. 1942).
10. See Musher Foundation v. Alba Trading Co., 127 F.2d 9, 11 (dissenting
opinion) ; see Note, 52 YALE L.J. 922 (1943).
11. See Kleinman v. Betty Dain Creations, supra note 1, at 551 n.6.
12. E.g., Cutting Room Appliances Corp. v. Empire Cutting Machine Co., 186
F.2d 997 (2d Cir. 1951); Kaplan v. Helenhart Novelty Corp., 182 F.2d 311 (2d Cir.

1950).
13. In the Kleinman case, three outstanding judges disagreed as to whether the
claim was in contract or tort. Chief Judge Learned Hand and Judge Augustus N.
Hand held the claim as one of breach of license, Judge Clark as one of unfair
competition.

14. See Mooaz, COMMENTARY ON THE JUDICIAL. CODE 150 (1949) : "If the broad
and fair construction of the subsection is adopted it will carry out the revisor's intention 'to avoid "piecemeal" litigation'; and federal jurisdiction to that extent has been
broadened." See also 2 CALLMAN, THE LAW OF UNPAM COMPETITION AND TRADEmARxs 1569 (1945).
15. See Schulman and Jaegerman, Some Jurisdictional Limitations on Federal
Procedure,45 YALE L.J. 393, 400 (1936).
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crowded. 16 It is probably because of these considerations, as well as experience with the workings of the Hum rule,1T that § 1338(b) was limited
to non-federal claims of unfair competition. Such private tort claims do
not generally involve important state policy matters,18 and usually, when
joined with a federal patent or copyright claim, do not involve an unreasonable amount of extra litigation for the federal courts to decide.' 9 Using
this analysis, it seems that the Court of Appeals in the Kleinman case might
well have interpreted plaintiff's non-federal cause of action, at least for the
purpose of applying § 1338(b), as one of unfair competition. Most of the
issues involved in the non-federal claim had been heard in testimony relating to the federal claim; the issues between the litigants were not of such
a nature that federal adjudication of them could possibly be usurpation of
the rights of a state or its courts; the amount of extra litigation in the
federal courts would have been slight.
It is uncertain why the Second Circuit went different ways in deciding
the two instant cases. The court in the Schreyer case distinguished the
Kleinman case only by saying that there plaintiff's non-federal claim sounded
primarily in contract. The simplest explanation is that five different Judges
heard the tvo cases. In the Kleinman case, both Judges Hand, long-time
exponents of the narrow "Second Circuit rule," constituted the majority,
with Judge Clark dissenting. In the Schreyer case, Judges Clark, Frank
and Swan sat and decided unanimously. The huge backlog of cases in the
Southern District of New York may also have influenced the decision in
the Kleinman case. Moreover, evidence in the record indicates that plaintiff had disclosed his patented device to a competitor of defendant prior to
his disclosures to the latter:4
His case was an extremely weak one.
Therefore, a contrary decision by the court of appeals would have meant
a re-opening of the second cause in a district court whose dockets were
already jammed and whose decision would undoubtedly have gone against
plaintiff. On the other hand, in the Schreyer case, the district court had
already decided that it did have jurisdiction and had ruled on the merits,
so that the upper court had merely to affirm judgment.
Such non-doctrinal considerations may not be dispositive of the instant distinction. Because of the elusive concept of unfair competition and
the likely possibility that a transaction will present a cause of action both in
unfair competition and in contract, these cases indicate that parties who
16. This is especially true in the Southern District of New York, where the
Kleininan case was decided. See REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE
OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS 111 (1950).
17. Nearly all the cases in which the Hum rule was applied involved joinder of
federal patent or copyright claims with a non-federal claim of unfair competition. The
only other type case to which the Hum rule frequently applied was that involving
injunction of state officials under state law when there was a claimed violation of the
14th Amendment. See Note, 61 HARv. L. REv. 362 (1948).
18. Contrast the different considerations that would be involved if a federal court
sought to hand down decisions interpreting a State's labor laws.
19. Section 1338(b) requires that the two claims have some relation.
20. [Transcript of Record, p. 71.1
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wish to bring themselves under § 1338(b) should use careful pleading, accenting the allegations that emphasize the tortious aspect of the transaction. 21
Another device that parties who desire to remain in the federal courts
might use is to frame their complaints within the unfair competition provisions of the Lanham Trade-Marks Act, 22 thereby giving federal color
to their theory of recovery. Recent decisions in two circuits interpreting
the Act hold that it conveys an independent federal action of unfair competition. 23 However, a District Court decision in the Second Circuit takes
a contrary stand.24 Because of the present vagueness of unfair competition and the language of § 1338(b), care in pleading may avail nothing,
since the nature of the transaction as a whole may lead a court to view the
facts as not within its conception of unfair competition. The only certain
solution is to amend § 1338(b) to permit federal jurisdiction over any
closely related non-federal claim joined with a federal patent or copyright
claim. Invariably, the related non-federal claim would be one of unfair
competition or breach of contract, or a mixture of both. There appear to
be no strong policy reasons for permitting federal jurisdiction over a dependent non-federal tort action but not over a dependent non-federal contract action.

HABEAS CORPUS-DUE PROCESS IN THE DETERMINATION OF AN ISSUE
OF INSANITY IN PENNSYLVANIA-Upon the denial of his petition for a

writ of habeas corpus by the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania' relator Smith,
under sentence of death for first degree murder, filed his petition with the
appropriate federal district court. That court, sitting en banc in the exer21. Plaintiff's complaint in the Kleinman case shows the interrelation of tort and
contract theories:
"14. That said defendant . . . agreed on behalf of defendant, Betty Dain

Creations, Inc., that should the use of the device be practicable and of use to
defendant after it had been duly tried, that plaintiff would be duly and adequately
compensated for use of said device.
"18. That the plaintiff at the time of making the disclosure of his creations
and devices to the defendant was led to believe that the disclosures were made
in strict confidence and that his secrecy in connection with his creations . . .
would not be violated.
"19. That the plaintiff herein relied upon the above representation and upon
the representations of payment for the use of said creations . . . made by the
said defendant and disclosed his creations . . . in full reliance upon the said
representations." [Transcript of Record, pp. 3-4.]
22. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1051-1127 (1946).
23. Stauffer v. Exley, 184 F2d 962 (9th Cir. 1950); In re Lyndale Farm, 186
F.2d 723 (3d Cir. 1951).
24. Ross Products, Inc. v. Newman, 94 F. Supp. 566 (S.D. N.Y. 1950). Court
reasoned that an interpretation of the Lanham Act permitting a federal unfair competition action would make § 1338(b) practically inoperative, and since § 1338(b) was
a later statute, Congress could not have intended the Lanham Act to give such a
federal cause of action.
1. Commonwealth ex rel. Smith v. Ashe, 364 Pa. 93, 71 A.2d 107 (1950), cert.
denied, 340 U.S. 812 (1950).
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cise of its discretion, declined to pass upon the merits of his case since the
highest state court had previously considered and disposed of the same
issues. 2 On appeal, the full court of appeals for the third circuit denied
the existence of any such discretion, but in a four to three decision affirmed
the dismissal on the ground that the petition set forth no violation of due
process. Unvited States ex rel. Smith v. Baldi, 3rd Cir., October 26, 1951.
Of particular interest among the numerous complex issues raised by
Smith's appeal are the related problems of the requirements of due process
as to the procedure by which his sanity was determined and as to the
adequacy of that determination. The United States Supreme Court has
never been compelled to decide whether a state law abolishing the defense
of insanity is a violation of the constitution.3 That question of substantive
due process is not raised directly here 4 for under the law of Pennsylvania
insanity at the time of the offense is a complete defense, and an insane person may neither be tried nor executed.5 Relator, however, is entitled to
have due process observed in the protection of that state-granted right even
though substantive due process might pot require that it be granted.6
Though Pennsylvania law appears to make ample provision for a
mental examination of a prisoner before trial, in the present case experienced counsel could find no procedure by which their well-founded doubts 7
2. United States ex rel. Smith v. Baldi, 96 F. Supp. 100 (1951).

The three dis-

senting judges took the position that no legal conclusions could properly be arrived at
in the absence of specific findings of fact. The only hearing on the allegations of
this petition was had in United States ex rel. Smith v. Warden, 87 F. Supp. 339
(1949), where the petition was dismissed for want of jurisdiction without a determination of the facts. Over counsel's objection the Pennsylvania Supreme Court made
use of this evidence.
3. In Solesbee v. Balkcom, 339 U.S. 9 (1950), where the issue was whether due
process required a trial-type hearing in passing on a prisoner's sanity before execution, Justice Frankfurter, dissenting, asserted that substantive due process forbade
the execution of a lunatic. The majority opinion, avoiding that issue, simply sustained the proceedings; cf. Phyle v. Duffy, 334 U.S. 431 (1948). If insanity raises
serious due process problems where the prisoner will lose his life as soon as he recovers, a fortiori the problem is more acute when it is offered as a defense; ef.
Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241 (1949). One state court has held such a statute
unconstitutional, State v. Strasburg, 60 Wash. 106, 110 Pac. 1020 (1910).
See Weihofen, Trial or Execution of the Insaw Defendant, 37 A.B.A.J. 651 (1951).
4. It can not be entirely avoided, however, where the criterion of legal insanity
does not do justice to medical knowledge. It has been said that, ". . . insanity is
not a defence to homicide at all in Pennsylvania." Laub, Insanity as a Defence To
Homicide In Pennsylvania,20 TEmp. L.Q. 345, 349 (1947).
5. PA. STAT. AN. tit. 50, § 48 (Purdon, 1950) ; Commonwealth v. Ragone, 317
Pa. 113, 176 Atl. 454 (1935).
6. Instant case at 6.
7. A resum6 of Smith's medico-penal history shows that he was temporarily
blind at birth and could not speak till five. Considered a "queer child" by his family,
at nine he was sent to reform school. His army record notes on three separate occasions that he was subject to nervous conditions. He was medically discharged. Indicted for larceny in New York, on examination he was found to be a hebephrenic
schizophrenic, formally adjudged insane, and committed to a hospital where he was
diagnosed as a catatonic schizophrenic. Later released as fit for trial, within a few
months he was admitted to a Philadelphia hospital at his own request because he told
a policeman that he was afraid of killing someone. On voluntary commitment he
could be kept no longer than 10 days. Two imprisonments in rapid succession followed and then the murder.
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of their client's sanity could be settled. Smith, a negro, had shot a taxi
driver under particularly brutal circumstances. His petition alleged that at
the moment of arraignment he was provided with an attorney who happened
then to be in court. The lunacy of the accused may first be raised on
arraignment. 8 Whether the question is then determined and by what means
rests within the discretion of the judge who need not even receive evidence on the prisoner's condition.9 Here the defendant lost the opportunity to have the judge exercise that discretion because the attorney standing beside him, having no knowledge of the case, could do no more than
enter a plea of not guilty.10 Private counsel retained for Smith by his
family then endeavoured to have petitioner examined by the state. Under
the Mental Health Act of 1923 the warden of the prison where the accused
was detained could apply to have him examined by a commission." The
warden here, who was not a psychiatrist, refused even the judge's request
to make that application. As the law was then understood the warden's
decision was final.' 2 Counsel also petitioned the court, setting forth Smith's
previous insanity, to have the prisoner admitted to a mental hospital for
an examination before trial. This petition was denied.' 3 In order to obtain
funds to subpoena the records and medical testimony relating to Smith's
commitment in New York, counsel then withdrew and was reappointed by
the court.' 4 At this point the plea was changed to guilty on the understanding that if the evidence from New York, when it arrived, was sufficient
to raise an issue of the relator's sanity, the court would consider a withdrawal of the plea of guilty. The change of plea lost Smith's chance to
avail himself of the Act of 1860 which permits the trial jury to pass upon
the defendant's present sanity as well as upon his guilt. 15 Counsel, with
8. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 19, § 1352 (Purdon, 1950).
9. Webber v. Commonwealth, 119 Pa. 223, 13 Atl. 427 (1888).
10. The dissenting judges in the court of appeals felt that under the circumstances
the prisoner was overreached at this point. This procedure has since been changed
by court rule to provide opportunity for consultation.
11. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 50, § 48 (Purdon, 1950).
12. Commonwealth v. Green, 346 Pa. 172, 29 A.2d 491 (1942); Commonwealth
v. Barnes, 280 Pa. 351, 124 At. 636 (1924). In Commonwealth ex rel. Smith V.
Ashe, 364 Pa. 93, 71 A.2d 107 (1950), the supreme court for the first time stated
that mandamus will lie to compel the warden to settle a question of post-trial insanity.
It is not clear if mandamus is also available prior to trial.
13. The court apparently felt that it was precluded from acting because of the
warden's jurisdiction. In Commonwealth ex rel. Smith v. Ashe, supra note 12; the
supreme court states that counsel has no standing to make such a petition, but it would
seem that the court might act on its own initiative under the power conferred by the
fifth paragraph of PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 50, § 48 (Purdon, 1950). In addition the court
still retains the common law power to grant an inquest in lunacy; Commonwealth
v. Barnes, 280 Pa. 351, 124 AtI. 636 (1924).
14. The funds thus made available by PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 19, § 784 (Purdon,
1950) do not extend to the employment of psychiatric assistance: Commonwealth v.
Green, 346 Pa. 172, 29 A.2d 491 (1943).
15. This archaic procedure is a product of the days when a prisoner was not
competent to testify on his own behalf. It now places him at a serious disadvantage
where there are factual issues, for there is an inescapable contradiction in asking
the jury to believe the accused's testimony on the facts while passing on his present
sanity. The issue of present insanity does not go to the prisoner's guilt or legal re-
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no reliable knowledge of their client's condition or testimony with which
to meet the burden of proving his insanity, apparently felt unable to go to
trial on the plea of not guilty. On the same day that the plea was changed,
Smith was adjudged guilty of first degree murder. A month later the evidence arrived and was considered prior to sentencing. The court considered it insufficient to permit withdrawal of the plea of guilty, but a
psychiatrist was appointed. On the receipt of his report that Smith was
sane and able to distinguish right from wrong, the death sentence was
imposed. The petition for habeas corpus further alleged that Smith was
in fact insane at the time both of his trial and of the homicide. 16 The Pennsylvania Supreme Court affirmed the conviction of felony murder on
appealY'
Faced with these facts, the majority of the court of appeals held that
due process does not require a hearing on a defendant's disputed mental
condition at any particular stage of the proceedings so long as an adequate
inquiry is made before the determination of guilt. They were less concerned
with the pre-trial procedure than with the contention that Smith had been
found guilty of first degree murder before evidence was heard as to his
sanity.:8 This point had been regarded as unimportant by the Supreme
Court of Pennsylvania, because in its view of the case the plea of guilty admitted his sanity and consequently the later evidence was relevant only to
the penalty. 19 The court of appeals declined that argument but accepted
the Pennsylvania court's alternative ground that if subsequent testimony
had persuaded the trial court that there was a reasonable doubt as to the
petitioner's sanity at the time of the crime, the plea of guilty could then
have been withdrawn. 20 In its approach it was important that the evidence
was considered not only in relation to the penalty but on the merits as
sponsibility but only to his capacity to cooperate with counsel and effectively defend
himself. Since that is purely a medical question, effective procedural reform here
will not involve changing the substantive law.
16. This allegation and others are denied by the state. In granting the rule
upon the Commonwealth to show cause why the writ of habeas corpus should not
issue, the supreme court determined that the petition showed probable cause; Commonwealth ex rel. McGlynn v. Smith, 344 Pa. 41, 24 A.2d 1 (1942). The dissent in
the court of appeals expresses the opinion that it was a denial of due process for the
supreme court to decide the case without an adjudication of the disputed questions
of fact. Cf. Pyle v. Kansas, 317 U.S. 213 (1942). The majority opinion considered
that the supreme court was entitled to rest its conclusions on the evidence taken before the district court since relator referred to it in his petition; see note 2 supra.
17. Commonwealth v. Smith, 362 Pa. 222, 66 A.2d 764 (1949). In all cases of
first degree murder it is the duty of the court to review both the law and the evidence
and to determine whether all the elements of first degree murder have been satisfactorily proved; PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 19, § 1187 (Purdon, 1950).
18. The docket entries show that judgment of first degree murder was made before this evidence was presented. The entries on the back of the bill of indictment
are to the contrary, but they appear in a most unnatural order, and the crucial date of
judgment is inserted between two earlier dates. Smith, whether faking or not, was
unable to testify, but counsel was permitted to speak for him.
19. Commonwealth ex rel. Smith v. Ashe, 364 Pa. 93, 112, 71 A.2d 107, 116

(1950).
20.

PA. STAT.

ANN. tit. 19, § 241 (Purdon, 1950).
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well. Because of the collateral nature of habeas corpus proceedings, the
weight of the evidence or failure to withdraw the plea of guilty were not
before it.21

The dissenting judges took the view, which the majority appears tacitly
to assume, that where there is a prima facie showing of present insanity,
the accused is entitled to some formal adjudication of his capacity to stand
trial. Smith was then denied due process if his sanity was considered
only in relation to sentence. In addition they felt that under Pennsylvania law the three-judge trial court was competent only to find the degree
of guilt when jury trial had been waived by a plea of guilty. 22 An insane
man cannot make a valid waiver of jury trial. Accordingly the trial court,
in finding Smith guilty of first degree murder, rejected the defense of insanity which it had no jurisdiction to do and thus deprived him of an
essential feature of trial by jury.2
Chief Justice Biggs' dissent also persuasively maintained that the trial
court's determination of the defendant's sanity was not sustained by sufficient probative data.24- In part the inadequacy of the diagnosis was attributed to M'Naghten's rule,25 which requires psychiatrists to deal with
mental conditions which do not exist save as legal conceptions. 26 Con21. E.g., Sunal v. Large, 332 U.S. 174 (1947); Bowen v. Johnston, 306 U.S. 19

(1938).

22. Commonwealth v. Petrillo, 340 Pa. 42, 16 A.2d 56 (1940). In Pennsylvania
the plea of guilty admits only that the defendant is guilty of second degree murder:
Commonwealth v. Iacobino, 319 Pa. 65, 178 Atl. 823 (1935). The determination of
the degree of guilt is considered part of the sentencing rather than part of the trial
process.
23. This argument appears subject to the defect that it proves too much. Any
other person who had pleaded guilty might now claim that he was then insane and
argue that determining the degree of his guilt necessarily involved rejecting a possible defense of insanity which the court had no jurisdiction to do. In addition, if
the court determines that the prisoner is presently sane his plea of guilty and waiver
of jury trial would seem to be valid. It is the alleged agreement to reserve the question of present sanity and sanity at the time of the offense for subsequent determination that lends peculiar force to the argument here.
24. In Pennsylvania the defendant has the burden of proving insanity by fairly
preponderating evidence when weighed against the presumption of his sanity and the
evidence of the Commonwealth in support of it, Commonwealth v. Lee, 233 Pa. 16,
81 Atl. 812 (1911). Former insanity is not presumed to have continued nor will
it shift the burden of proof. Commonwealth v. Calhoun, 238 Pa. 474, 86 Atl. 472
(1913).
25. 10 C. & F. 198, 8 Eng. Rep. 718 (House of Lords, 1843). The leading case
in Pennsylvania is Commonwealth v. Mosler, 4 Pa. 264 (1846). Chief Justice Gibsons' charge rests in part on M'Naghten's rule, the language of which has been
adopted by later cases; see, e.g., Commonwealth v. Neill, 362 Pa. 507, 67 A.2d 276
(1949). Irresistible impulse, though hesitantly recognized by Chief Justice Gibson,
is no longer a defense. Commonwealth v. Schroeder, 302 Pa. 1, 152 At. 835 (1931).
26. For decades that rule which makes the knowledge of right and wrong the
criterion of legal responsibility has been subject to a storm of criticism. See, e.g.,
2 STEPHENS, HisTORy OF THE CRIMINAL LAW OF ENGLANvD 154-159 (1883) ; Keedy,
Insanity and Criminal Responsibility, 30 HARv. L. REv. 535 (1917). Professor Keedy
condemns the rule as obsolete medical theory crystallized into law and proposes instead that mental disease should be a defense wherever it prevents the formation of
the requisite criminal intent. See also Arnold, Insanity and Criminal Responsibility,
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ceding that ordinarily such a result was mere error as distinguished from
the denial of a constitutional right,27 the minority felt that here it went both
to Smith's capacity to defend himself and to the jurisdiction of the court.
After thorough examination in two New York hospitals Smith had been
diagnosed as a schizophrenic. The recovery rate from that psychosis is
extremely low.28 Some of the circumstances of his release from the hospital as fit for trial indicate that the release may have been for administrative
as well as medical reasons. From the record it appears that in the present
case the court-appointed psychiatrist saw Smith for about an hour on two
occasions eight months after the offense. 29 The examination consisted
of talking to Smith and reading his confession to him to determine
whether he was able to distinguish right from wrong. No other psychiatrist was consulted, though the conclusion was the serious charge that he
was faking.30 If a doctor's civil liability is predicated on failure to use
reasonable care according to the standards of the medical community,
surely a state permitting the defense of insanity owes an indigent prisoner
on trial for his life an examination meeting a comparable standard.
There is a dearth of authority as to what constitutes a denial of due
process in the determination of an issue of insanity. The recent case of
McGarty v. O'Brien3 1 held that it was not a denial of due process for a
state to refuse to employ defense psychiatrists after two psychiatrists of
an independent state agency had fully examined the prisoner and submitted
their report before trial. Though that decision is regarded by the majority opinion as practically on all fours with the present appeal, it is dis10

He suggests that responsibility is an
J. Cmm. L. & CRMINOLOGY 184 (1919).
academic question, the problem being one of treatment of persons known to be dangerous. He proposes to have the jury decide only if the defendant did the act
and have experts determine the treatment. Such an approach has the great advantage of removing doctors from the guilt finding process and placing them where they
may objectively use their medical knowledge. It is however subject to certain constitutional difficulties; see GLUECK, MENTAL DISORDER AND THE CRIMINAL LAw 455
(1925).
27. Insanity is an issue of fact and the correctness of the conclusion will not be
examined collaterally. McMahan v. Hunter, 150 F.2d 498 (10th Cir. 1945).
28. See GLUECK, MENTAL DISORDER AND THE CRIMINAL LAW 354 et seq. (1925).
Schizophrenia (dementia praecox) is characterized by an apparent splitting of the
intellect from the affective reactions and the will. Paradoxically the schizophrenic
is medically insane because he approaches what the legal test assumes to be the
normal condition.
29. One of the strong arguments for a mental examination at the earliest possible
date is the extreme difficulty of estimating at the time of the examination what the
defendant's condition was months earlier at the time of the offense; see Weihofen,
Eliminating the Battle of Experts in Crintinal Ituanity Cases, 48 MIcH. L. Rav. 961,

975 (1950).

30. Since the schizophrenic may apparently have his reasoning powers intact, his
actual abnormality can only be demonstrated by more extensive tests than are usually
given; see GLuECK, MENTAL DISORDER AND THE CRIMINAL LAw 362 (1925). This
increases the dangers of having the determination of sanity rest on the judgment of one

psychiatrist; see Solesbee v. Balkcom, 339 U.S. 9, 25 (1950).
31. 188 F.2d 151 (1st Cir. 1951).
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similar in two significant respects. There the examination was before
trial so that counsel had the benefit of competent, contemporaneous medical information on which to base their case. Here it was the inability to
obtain such information that led to the change of plea and impaired the
subsequent proceedings. There, also there was no indication that the prisoner had formerly been adjudged insane or that the examination was anything but thorough. The dissenting judges in the court of appeals came to
the conclusion that, in capital cases where there are grave indicia of mental
disease, psychiatric assistance must be afforded counsel for an indigent defendant where it is necessary to prepare their case. In such a situation
counsel can not otherwise render the effective assistance contemplated by
the requirements of due process.32 In the present case the necessity for a
determination of the defendant's sanity in limine was demonstrated by
what actually resulted from the want of it. It is submitted that the proceedings here sustained stretch the concept of due process to the very limit.
In deciding that the treatment afforded Smith was not a denial of
due process, the court of appeals leaves Pennsylvania with the responsibility of remedying the marked inadequacies that gave rise to the present
appeal. The statutes as now interpreted and applied are insufficient to
insure an examination of the prisoner before trial. Counsel apparently has
no standing to petition for an examination, and the courts are uncertain
as to their authority to act when the accused is held in prison awaiting
trial.33 This situation should be corrected, for the capacity to stand trial
can fairly be determined at no other time, and even where it is only a
matter of a possible defense of insanity such information is essential to
the preparation for trial. The much-commended Briggs statute in Massachusetts provides a routine mental examination before the trial of those
under indictment for a capital offense and certain other categories of
offenders. 34 This provision no longer leaves an inquiry into the defendant's condition dependent on caprice or choice, and thereby reduces to a
minimum the trial of persons who because of mental abnormality are unfit
to stand trial and can more wisely be otherwise disposed of. Such a routine is expensive, but in practice there are large compensatory savings in
that the experts' reports are frequently accepted as a working basis for the
disposition of the case. Failing such a statute, Senator Ruth's proposed
bill would remedy in part this defect in Pennsylvania procedure.33
32. Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932).
33. Commonwealth ex rel. Smith v. Ashe, 364 Pa. 93, 71 A.2d 107 (1950), has in
part removed this doubt by emphsizing the wide discretion of the court. Whether or
not a court may at this time act under the Act of 1923 remains uncertain.
34. MAss. LAWs ANN. tit. 123, § 100 (A) (1950); see Overholser, The Briggs
Law of Massachusetts, 25 J. CRim. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 859 (1936) ; Glueck, Psychiatric
Examination of Persons Accused of Crime, 36 YALE L.J. 632 (1927).
35. Senate Bill #157. This bill authorizes the establishment of medical clinics
for the examination prior to trial of persons charged with criminal offenses.
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INCOME TAX-THE "CLAIM OF RIGHT" DOCTRINE-TAXABILITY

OF

MONEY-Defendant was convicted of evading the payment of
the income tax on $250,000 which he obtained from one Reinfeld. Defendant, Reinfeld, and others jointly participated in a bootlegging venture
during prohibition. After this venture disbanded, the others without the
defendant formed a legitimate liquor business. Years later, defendant
claimed an interest in the business, which interest was bought out by
Reinfeld for friendship's sake. Following the sale of the business at a
large profit, defendant demanded more money and threatened to kill
Reinfeld if he were not paid. There was evidence from which the jury
could conclude that Reinfeld delivered the money in question in 1943 solely
because of these threats. Defendant then gave a general release of all of
his claims to Reinfeld. The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit held
that this money was income taxable to defendant since he had received
it with a "semblance of a bona fide claim of right." 1 United States v.
Rutkin, 189 F.2d 431 (3d Cir.), cert. granted, 72 Sup. Ct. 50 (1951).
The case of North American Oil Consolidated v. Burnet2 announced
EXTORTED

the principle that "[i] f a taxpayer receives earnings under a claim of right

and without restriction as to its disposition, he has received income which
he is required to return, even though it may still be claimed that he is not
entitled to retain the money. .

.. "

8 That case involved the question of

when to tax money that had been impounded by a court and then released. 4
The doctrine was then extended to tax income in the year of its receipt
under a claim of right even though the taxpayer's right to the money was
contested and restitution was possible 5 or had even been accomplished.0
The principle underlying the use of the doctrine in this fashion found
1. Instant case at 435. The charge of the judge was that "If that money was
extorted and was paid as the result of threats, then it was taxable income... "
The Court of Appeals held this not error for want of definition of "extortion." Ibid.
There was also a corrected charge on an evidence question: "If you believe the witness
lied in any respect . . . you may accept or reject such testimony as you believe to
be false or true, accept the true and reject the false. . .

."

The court held this

corrected charge stated the law and was not prejudicial. Id. at 438-440. However, in
Law Week's statement of the contentions argued in favor of the granting of the
petition for certiorari, only the question of the taxability of extorted money is mentioned. 20 U.S.L. WEEK 3044 (1951).
2. 286 U.S. 417 (1932).
3. Id. at 424.
4. The money involved was earnings from the operation of oil lands which were
in dispute. The money was paid into court and given to the taxpayer when the court
handed down a decree in its favor in 1917. The decree was appealed and not affirmed
until 1922. The issue was solely the year in which the money was taxable; held,
taxable in 1917.
5. Jacobs v. Hoey, 136 F.2d 954 (2d Cir. 1943) (commissions as executor received
in 1936 subject to approval of surrogate; approval given in 1938; money held taxable
in 1936).
6. E.g., United States v. Lewis, 340 U.S. 590 (1951) (excessive bonuses received
in 1944, returned in 1946); Comm'r v. Alamitos Land Co., 112 F.2d 648 (9th Cir.
1940) (funds received pursuant to a judgment later reversed) ; Saunders v. Comm'r,
101 F.2d 407 (10th Cir. 1939) (excessive salaries received in 1929-31, repaid in 1931).
These cases also hold that a deduction from gross income is allowed in the year of
the restitution.
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support in its facilitation of the administration of the taxing statute.7 The
government should be able to exact its taxes without being compelled
to take sides in private controversies." An almost imperceptible shift
in application of the doctrine then occurred when it was held that money
was not income at all unless it had been received under a claim of right.'
Section 22(a) of the Internal Revenue Code defines gross income to
include ". . . gains or profits and income derived from any source
whatever. . . ." It is now established that this section is modified by
the claim-of-right doctrine. 10 However, prior to 1946, the doctrine was
not applied to criminally obtained money. Such money had been taxed
,as income even where there was no conceivable claim of right, such as
ransom money paid to a kidnapper,"- or interest acquired at usurious
rates.' 2 Other illegal gains, such as graft,' 3 protection payments to a
racketeer, 14 or bootlegging profits,' 5 were easily taxed.'(
In 1946 the Supreme Court held, in Commissioner of InternalRevenue
v. Wilcox1 that embezzled funds were not taxable in the hands of the
embezzler. The reason given was that the taxability of money as income
"is conditioned upon (1) the presence of a claim of right to the alleged
gain and (2) the absence of a definite, unconditional obligation to repay
or return that which would otherwise constitute a gain." 18 These conditions were not met in the Wilcoxr case since the embezzler did not take
under a claim of right, and his employer still held him liable to repay
7. 2 MERTENS, LAW OF FEDERAL INCOME TAXATIONr § 12.103 (1942). But see
Comment, Taxing Unsettled Income: The "Clain; of Right" Test, 58 YALE L.J. 955
(1949) to the effect that the doctrine should be discarded. Both of these works
contain excellent collections of the cases applying the test of claim-of-right.
8. ". . . collection of the revenue cannot be delayed nor should the Treasury
be compelled to decide when a possessor's claims are without legal warrant. If he
holds with a claim of right, he should be taxable as an owner, regardless of any infirmity of his title. . . ." L. Hand, J., in National City Bank v.Helvering, 98 F.2d
93, 96 (2d Cir. 1938).
9. Comm'r v.Turney, 82 F.2d 661 (5th Cir. 1936). Turney received bonus from
sale of oil lease, apparently unaware that he had to pay one-half to the State of Texas.
The court held he could not have had a claim of right; therefore the bonus was not
income.
10. Moore v. Thomas, 131 F.2d 611 (5th Cir. 1942). "Under that settled practice,
itis important only to determine whether the moneys in question were claimed and
treated by the taxpayer as its earnings, and therefore taxable as income to it."Id.
at 613.
11. Humphreys v. Comm'r, 42 B.T.A. 857 (1940), aff'd, 125 F.2d 340 (7th Cir.
1942).
12. W.R. Hervey, 25 B.T.A. 1282 (1932) ; cf. Barker v.Magruder, 95 F.2d 122
(D.C. Cir. 1938) (uncollected accrued usurious interest).
13. Chadick v. United States, 77 F.2d 961 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 296 U.S. 609
(1935).
14. Johnson v.United States, 318 U.S. 189 (1943).
15. Steinberg v.United States, 14 F.2d 564 (2d Cir. 1926).
16. It was felt that policy reasons dictated taxation of criminals. See the statement of Holmes, J., in United States v. Sullivan, 274 U.S. 259, 263 (1927) (illicit
traffic in liquor) : "We see no reason . . . why the fact that a business is unlawful
should exempt itfrom paying the taxes that iflawful itwould have to pay."
17. 327 U.S. 404 (1946).
18. Id. at 408.
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the amount taken.' 9 This extension of the doctrine into the criminal field
casts doubt upon the taxability of the proceeds of any of the acquisitive
crimes where there was no doubt before. After this decision, the Bureau
of Internal Revenue interpreted its effect as producing tax immunity only
for the proceeds of the act of embezzlement 2 0 The vitality of the Wilcox
case has been further lessened by recent court decisions distinguishing it
on technical grounds. Money obtained by false pretenses has been held
taxable, the distinction being that "title" passed to the swindler but not
to the embezzler. 21 A black-marketeer's profits were taxed although he
counterfeited sugar stamps and used his company's funds to obtain the
sugar which he sold, pocketing the overcharge 22 The court said that embezzlement was a technical statutory crime requiring strict proof, and
that there was no evidence present of a specific sum embezzled so as to
put the taxpayer under the Wilcox rule.2 3 The instant case is but another
example of the pull for taxability leading to a narrowing of the Wilcox
doctrine on technical grounds.
The court in the instant case was hard pressed to hold that the Wilcox
conditions for taxability were satisfied. The "claim of right" was found
in Reinfeld's never denying the presence of defendant's claim, defendant's
executing a release in return for the money, and his referring on frequent
occasions to the demanded sum as "my money." 24 The "unconditional
obligation" test was met by noting that Reinfeld had never challenged
the disputed transaction, and had permitted the statute of limitations to
expire on whatever right he might have had to reclaim the money.2 5 This
reasoning brought about the desired result of taxation, but it is submitted
that there is no practical difference between the effects of extortion and
embezzlement. 2 6 The people involved in the instant case have been
characterized as big-time racketeers,2 7 and an old fashioned robbery is
not practiced in that set. Their attempts to obtain money not due them
are usually based on some sort of spurious claim; threats are held in reserve, to be used only if the victim does not honor the original "claim."
This sophisticated extortion surely does not give its user a bona fide claim
19. Ibid.
20. G.C.M. 24945, 1946-2 CuM. BULL. 27: "The mere act of embezzlement does
not of itself result in taxable income to the embezzler for Federal income tax purposes.
If the owner condones the taking of the property, and forgives the indebtedness, taxable
income may result to the embezzler, depending on the facts in the particular case."
21. Akers v. Scofield, 167 F.2d 718 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 335 U.S. 823 (1948).
22. Wallace H. Petit, 10 T.C. 1253 (1948).

23.
24.
25.
years.

Id. at 1257.
Instant case at 435.
Id. at 436. The New Jersey statute of limitations on this type of suit is six
NJ. STAT. Amr. § 2:24-1 (1939).
26. This was the position taken by Judge Hastie, dissenting at pages 441-42 of
the instant case.
27. The Kefauver Committee reports the transaction involved in the instant case
and names all the parties in the deal. Smq. REP. No. 725, 82d Cong., 1st Sess. 66-67

(1951).
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of right such as is required by the Wilcox case. 28 In addition, this defendant, at the end of the year in which he received the money, still had an
obligation to repay it since it was obtained through duress. 29 Whether
money received during a year is taxable as income must generally be determined as of the end of that year.80 Since the obligation to repay still
existed at that time, the Wilcox case would dictate an exemption for this
defendant, but such a result seems unfair to the honest citizen. As long
as the Wilcox case stands, courts will distinguish it on as technical and
tenuous grounds as those in the instant case.31 It is submitted that the
claim-of-right doctrine should be removed from the criminal field since
its underlying purpose, the facilitation of the administration of the taxing
statute, is not being served. The effect of the Wilcox decision was to
exempt totally embezzled funds from taxation.3 2 The administration has
been further hampered by a waste of time and money in litigation where
taxpayers have attempted to prove that they are embezzlers so as to come
within the Wilcox rule.33 Recent revelations of the Kefauver Committee
regarding the nationwide prevalence of racketeering, bribery, and extortion 3 4 point up the fact that these income tax evasion prosecutions will be
occurring more frequently. The need for uniformity in tax rules at the
present time is therefore great. Tax liability should not depend on the
technicalities of the criminal law. The instant case presents the Supreme
Court with the opportunity to remove the claim-of-right doctrine from
the criminal field by overruling the Wilcox case.

JURISDICTION-FOREIGN CORPORATIONS-STATUTE SUBJECTING FOREIGN CORPORATIONS TO JURISDICTION OF STATE COURT IN SUIT ARISING
OUT OF TORT COMMITTED WITHIN STATE DOES NOT VIOLATE DUE
PROCESS-A Massachusetts corporation, whose only activity in Vermont was

the re-roofing of plaintiff's house, was sued in a Vermont court for damage
to the house alleged to have resulted from defendant's negligence in per28. 327 U.S. at 408: "Vithout some bona fide legal or equitable claim, even though
it be contingent or contested in nature, the taxpayer cannot be said to have realized
any gain or profit within the reach of § 22 (a)."
29. Miller v. Eisele, 111 N.J.L. 268, 168 Atl. 426 (1933); and generally on the
problem of recovery of payments made under compulsion, see RESTATEMENT, RESTITU-

TioN § 70 (1937).
30. INT. REv. CODE § 42(a); Freihofer Baking Co. v. Comm'r, 151 F.2d 383 (3d
Cir. 1945).
31. See also the cases cited at notes 21 and 22 supra.
32. INT. REv. CODE § 23 (e), (f) allows a deduction from the gross income of the
victim, either private or corporate, for losses sustained which are not covered by
insurance. Embezzlement losses are such. Summerhill Tubing Co. v. Comm'r, 36
B.T.A. 347 (1937).
33. Wallace H. Petit, note 22 supra (black-marketeer) ; United States v. Currier
Lumber Co., 70 F. Supp. 219 (D. Mass. 1947) (taxpayer misappropriated corporate

funds).

34. SEN. REP. No. 141, 82d Cong., Ist Sess. 26-28 (1951).
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forming the work. Jurisdiction in personam by means of substituted service of process 1 was acquired by the court under a statute which subjects a
foreign corporation to jurisdiction of Vermont courts in any litigation growing out of a tort committed in Vermont against a Vermont resident. 2 Defendant's motion to dismiss was granted, and on appeal, it argued that
the statute was unconstitutional. The court remanded the action, holding
the statute consistent with the due process clause of the federal Constitution. Smyth v. Twin State Improvement Corp., 80 A.2d 664 (Vt. 1951).
At one time, state courts could assume jurisdiction to render a personal judgment against a non-resident only if the non-resident gave consent, or was present in the jurisdiction, or made a voluntary general appearance.3 With the growth of a national economy there has developed a
gradual expansion of the scope of local power over non-residents, directed
principally at making them subject to suit in courts of a state within which
activity giving rise to a cause of action has taken place. The fact of "doing
business" within a state became a basis for jurisdiction over foreign corporations, on the theory that the corporation thereby gave "implied consent" to jurisdiction 4 or could be considered "present" in the forum.5 As
applied, this test seemed to require activity of a fairly substantial and continuous nature in order to justify the fictions used. 6 However, the transaction of business was held insufficient to subject a non-resident individual
1. Service of process was made on defendant in accordance with VT. RYv. STAT.

§ 1563 (1947) by service on the Vermont Secretary of State as process agent for the

defendant, and by forwarding a copy of the process by registered mail to defendant at
its principal place of business. It was not questioned that the method used was
"reasonably calculated to give actual notice to the defendant of the pendancy of the
litigation." Instant case at 665.
2. VT. RFv. STAT. § 1562 (1947). "Doing business, definition, service of process.
If a foreign corporation makes a contract with a resident of Vermont to be performed in whole or in part by either party in Vermont, or if such foreign corporation
commits a tort in whole or in part in Vermont against a resident of Vermont, such
acts shall be deemed to be doing business in Vermont by such foreign corporation and
shall be deemed equivalent to the appointment by such foreign corporation of the
secretary of the state of Vermont and his successors to be its true and lawful attorney
upon whom may be served all lawful process in any actions or proceedings against
such foreign corporation arising from or growing out of such contract or tort. .. ."
3. Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714 (1877) (jurisdiction over individuals); St.
Clair v. Cox, 106 U.S. 350 (1882) (jurisdiction over corporations).
4. See Mutual Life Insurance Co. v. Spratley, 172 U.S. 602, 618 (1899). Since
a state could exclude a foreign corporation from acting within its territory, it was

considered that a state could impose as a condition of entry that the corporation
consent to local jurisdiction, and that by "doing business" the corporation impliedly
accepted that condition.
5. See People's Tobacco Co. v. American Tobacco Co., 246 U.S. 79, 87 (1918).
. the business must be of such nature and character as to warrant the inference
that the corporation has subjected itself to the local jurisdiction, and is by its duly
authorized officers or agents present within the State or district where service is
attempted."
6. See, e.g., Rosenberg Bros. & Co. v. Curtis Brown Co., 260 U.S. 516 (1923)
(commission of single or occasional acts in a state not enough to justify jurisdiction).
Mere solicitation of business by corporate agents was held to be insufficient in Green
v. Chicago, B. & Q. Ry., 205 U.S. 530 (1907), but solicitation coupled with other
activity was held to be "doing business" in International Harvester Co. v. Kentucky,
234 U.S. 579 (1914).
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to local jurisdiction; 7 power over individuals was extended by other means.
Activities which threaten physical injury or economic harm to residents are
subject to regulation by a state; therefore statutes subjecting non-resident
individuals to local jurisdiction in personam in suits arising out of such
activities have been upheld as valid exercise of the police power by the
state to protect its citizens.8 More recently, starting with International
Shoe Co. v. State of Washington,0 the emphasis has shifted from the harmful nature of local activity and the fictions of "implied consent" and
"presence" to a determination of whether there exist between the state and
the non-resident corporation or individual such "minimum contacts" as to
make reasonable and just the assumption of jurisdiction over litigation
growing out of those contacts.' 0 This has made it possible for courts to base
their decisions in this field directly on realistic factors which motivated
former decisions without being restricted by having to justify their decisions
in terms of artificial doctrines. The result has been a continuation of the
trend of extending the scope of local jurisdiction in accordance with the
needs of a national economy."
The instant case carries the extension of the power of local courts an
important step further by indicating how little activity is required to subject
a foreign corporation to local jurisdiction.' 2 It is the first appellate decision to hold squarely that jurisdiction over a foreign corporation may be
acquired by virtue of a single tort committed within the state. The decision
seems in line with the gradual development of jurisdictional concepts, and
from a practical point of view makes good sense. As pointed out by the
court, if the activity which gives rise to the tort action takes place within
a state, the witnesses are likely to be readily available there, and the laws
of that state will govern the litigation, so that the courts of that state are
7. Flexner v. Farson, 248 U.S. 289 (1919).
The fiction of "implied consent!'
failed as justification for local jurisdiction because a state has no power to exclude
individuals. The "presence" theory would also be of little help, based as it was on the
fact that a corporation can be present in any location only through its agents, for an
individual can only be present where his physical body is.
8. Doherty v. Goodman, 294 U.S. 623 (1935) (business of dealing in securities);
Hess v. Pawloski, 274 U.S. 352 (1927) (operation of motor vehicles); Dubin v.
Philadelphia, 34 Pa. D.&C. 61 (1938) (personal injury because local real estate of
non-resident not properly maintained).
9. 326 U.S. 310 (1945) ; cf. Travelers Health Ass'n v. Virginia, 339 U.S. 643
(1950).

10.

"...

due process requires only that in order to subject a defendant to a

judgment in personam, if he be not present within the territory of the forum, he
have certain minimum contacts with it such that the maintenance of the suit does not
offend 'traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice."' International Shoe
Co. v. State of Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945).
11. Thus, local jurisdiction now covers numerous situations over which courts
formerly were denied jurisdiction. Compare Travelers Health Ass'n v. Virginia, 339
U.S. 643 (1950), with Minnesota Commercial Men's Ass'n v. Bein, 261 U.S. 140

(1923).
12. At least one prior decision had applied the "minimum contact" test to uphold

a statute as broad in its coverage as the statute in the instant case, but the foreign
corporation in the earlier case had engaged in regular and continuous solicitation
within the state for over a year as contrasted with the single act of defendant here.
Johns v. Bay State Abrasive Products Co., 89 F. Supp. 654 (D. Md. 1950); see
Gillioz v. Kincannon, 213 Ark. 1010, 1017, 1018, 214 S.W.2d 212, 216 (1948).
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the logical forum of convenience for settlement of the dispute. In addition,
denial of local jurisdiction in effect may be denial of any legal remedy to a
resident plaintiff in cases where the amount of his claim is greatly exceeded
by the costs of transporting witnesses to a foreign jurisdiction.' 3 And since
the corporation has made the contact in the state to further business interests, the argument can be made that it is reasonable to subject the corporation to any possible financial burden of defending locally a tort claim
growing out of that contact as one of the costs or risks of doing business
there.
Consideration of the instant case raises the question whether local
jurisdiction on the basis of a single contact in the forum can be asserted
when that single contact is a tort of a non-resident individual, or a contract
between a resident and a non-resident individual or corporation, which
contract is to be performed at least partly within the state.14 A deternination of reasonableness in any of these situations will depend on a balancing
of factors slightly different from those present in the instant case. In a
contract action, the law of the state of performance does not necessarily
govern; it may be necessary to apply the law of the place where the contract was executed.' 5 And with a contract claim, it is no more probable
that witnesses will be present in the state of performance than that they
will be located elsewhere. The fact that the local contact of the non-resident
may be a business one, directed at furthering his profits, is relevant to local
power over both tort and contract claims, and furnishes a strong argument
in support of the reasonableness of local jurisdiction. Against local jurisdiction based on a single contact is the fact that, in both tort and contract
situations, it may place an unduly heavy financial burden on the nonresident by imposing on him the expense of coming into the forum to defend agaiIst a claim. Coupled with this objection is the fact that assumption of jurisdiction places the non-resident at the mercy of unscrupulous
residents who may file unfounded claims for amounts so small that it will be
cheaper for the non-resident to pay them, or to suffer default judgments,
than to appear in the local courts to defend against the claims.
If the corporate defendant in the instant case had been sued for a breach
of the single contract it performed in Vermont, it is likely that local jurisdiction would have been upheld under the statute in question because the
contract was made to derive a business advantage from an act within the
state, the cost of defending locally being considered a legitimate expense
of furthering that interest. The same reasoning could be applied to a tort
13. Instant case at 668. See Wein v. Crockett, 113 Utah 301, 314, 195 P.2d 222,
228 (1948).
14. In addition to giving its courts power over tort claims, the Vermont statute
provides for personal jurisdiction over a foreign corporation in any action resulting
from a contract with a Vermont resident, if the contract is to be partly performed
within Vermont. See note 2 supra. A similar statute might well be enacted to
confer jurisdiction over non-resident individuals in actions based on local torts oi
contracts with residents when the contracts are to be performed within the state.
15. See GOODRICH, CONFLICr OF LAWS § 110 (3d ed. 1949).
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or contract action growing out of a single business contact of an individual.
But it is doubtful whether courts will recognize local jurisdiction based on
a single contact of a non-resident individual whose contact is not in furtherance of a business interest nor involves activity generally harmful to residents.16 Absent both of these elements, the possibilities of harassment and
prohibitive expense may be sufficient to cause the courts to hold that the
single contact is not enough to make the assumption of local jurisdiction
reasonable.

LABOR LAW-UNFAIR

LABOR

PRACTICEs-EMPLOYER's

RIGHT

TO

DIsCHARGE-Employee, Paladino, represented his union at a meeting with
his employer and an N.L.R.B. representative, where the employer made the
statement that his interstate purchases and sales each exceeded $500,000.
Later the employee reported the meeting to a union committee. Afterwards,
a rumor circulated through the shop that the employer's profits were
$500,000, and the employee was discharged allegedly because employer suspected him of lying about the profits. The N.L.R.B. accepted the trial
examiner's finding that the employer really discharged the employee because
he was engaged in union activity, that this violated the National Labor
Relations Act, and, therefore, the employer was ordered to reinstate.' On
appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed, granting that there was sufficient
evidence to show that Paladino had been discriminated against because of
his union activities. Also, the court used the findings of the Board that
Paladino had not lied in fact and that he was engaged in union activity
at the time he was suspected of lying as sufficient to establish conclusively
that he could not be discharged in such a case even if the real reason had
been, as employer contended, a reasonable suspicion of the employer that
the employee had lied. Cusano v. N.L.R.B., 190 F.2d 898 (3rd Cir. 1951).
Federal labor legislation has given employees the right to form, join,
or assist labor organizations and to engage in other concerted activities for
the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection. In
order to assure employees that they may engage in such activities, employers are restrained from interfering with, or from discriminatorily discharging employees in order to discourage the employees from engaging in,
these activities.2 Although the employer cannot discharge his employee in
order to so discriminate,3 he may otherwise discharge him for a good reason, a poor reason, or no reason at all.4 Even if there are mistakes, de16. See note 8 supra.

1. 92 N.L.R.B. 1272 (1951).
2. 49 STAT. 452 (1935), 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1946), as amended, 61 STAT. 140
(1947), 29 U.S.C. § 157 (Supp. 1950); and 49 STAT. 452 (1935), 29 U.S.C. § 158
(1946), as amended, 61 STAT. 140 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 158 (a), (1) & (3) (Supp.
1950).

3. Interlake Iron Corp v. NLRB, 131 F.2d 129, 132 (7th Cir. 1942).
4. "The act does not interfere with the normal exercise of the right of the employer to select its employess or to discharge them. . . . the Board is not entitled
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parture from the regular procedure, and discrimination in the discharge,
the layoff cannot be questioned unless the employer's real reason for the
discharge was to discourage the employee's union activities.&5 The N.L.R.B.
has the burden to prove that such discrimination was the employer's reason,6 and if a finding by the N.L.R.B. to this effect is supported by substantial evidence the reviewing court will not reverse. 7
Undoubtedly, the finding of discrimination to discourage union activities was supported by substantial evidence in the present case. The facts
that Paladino was engaged in union activity 8 at the time he was suspected
of lying, that he was an active union member, and that the employer was
currently disagreeing with the union would all tend to prove that the employer's real reason for the discharge was to discriminate unlawfully. 9
Similarly, the finding by the N.L.R.B. that the suspicions of the employer
were incorrect would tend to prove that the employer's given reason was a
fabrication. '° However, in response to the employer's contention that he
reasonably believed the employee had lied, and that the discharge was thus
to make its authority a pretext for interference with the right of discharge when that
right is exercised for other reasons than such intimidation and coercion.' NLRB
v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 45, 46 (1936) ; see Phelps Dodge Corp.
v. NLRB, 313 U.S. 177, 183 (1941). "The Board does not dispute the contention
that the employee may be discharged by the employer for a good reason, a poor reason, or no reason at all, so long as the terms of the statute are not violated."
NLRB v. Condenser Corp., 128 F.2d 67, 75 (3d Cir. 1942). See NLRB v. KohenLigon Folz, Inc., 128 F.2d 502 (5th Cir. 1942) and NLRB v. American Pearl Button
Co., 149 F.2d 258, 260 (8th Cir. 1945).
5. "We are concerned here, as in the Condenser case, with a question of fact
concerning human motive, 'namely, the real reason for the discharge." NLRB v.
Electric City Dyeing Co., 178 F.2d 980, 982 (3d Cir. 1950) ; see NLRB v. Condenser
Corp., 128 F.2d 67, 75 (3d Cir. 1942).
6. ".

.

.

the burden was on the Board . . . to require their reinstatement, to

show not that they were laid off because of antipathy against them because of their
union activity, but that their laying off was the unfair labor practice denounced by
Section 8(3), 'by discrimination, etc., to encourage or discourage membership in a
union."' Stonewall Cotton Mills, Inc. v. NLRB, 129 F.2d 629, 632, 633 (5th Cir.
1942), cert. denied, 317 U.S. 667, "It was the burden of the Bo rd to show that
Burlich was not only discriminated against in his ratings and therefore in his layoff,
but that the discrimination was due to his union activities." Interlake Iron Corporation v. NLRB, 131 F.2d 129, 133, 134 (7th Cir. 1942). See Waterman Steamship
Corp. v. NLRB, 103 F.2d 157 (5th Cir. 1939), rev'd on other grounds, 309 U.S. 206,
rehearing denied, 309 U.S. 696; NLRB v. Alco Feed Mills, 133 F.2d 419, 421 (5th
Cir. 1943).
7. See Consolidated Edison Co. v. NLRB, 305 U.S. 197, 229 (1938).
8. Making the report to the union committee was the union activity, and in the
instant case employer did not contend otherwise. Cf. Republic Aviation Corp. v.
NLRB, 324 U.S. 793 (1945).
9. North Carolina Finishing Co. v. NLRB, 133 F.2d 714 (4th Cir. 1943),
"While of course this fact [that employees were active in the union] in itself is no
bar to the discharge of an employee for legitimate reasons, it may well disclose the
real motive actuating an anti-union employer in discharging such an employee when
the reasons given for the action do not ring true.' Burk Brothers v. NLRB, 116
F.2d 686, 687 (3d Cir. 1941).
10. Ibid. "But it does not follow from that undisputed proposition of law that a
failure to give a reason, or giving evasive or contradictory reason by management may
not be considered in determining the question of fact as to the real motive for the discharge." NLRB v. Condenser Corp., 128 F.2d 67, 75 (3d Cir. 1942); cf. NLRB v.
Kohen-Ligon Folz, 128 F.2d 502 (5th Cir. 1942).
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not discriminatory, the court, instead of relying on the Board's finding
of discrimination, stated conclusively that an employee cannot be discharged
on an erroneous observation of fact when the acts of which he is suspected
occurred while the employee was engaged in union activity.,' This could
lead to peculiar results. Under this broad language if an employer reasonably suspected an employee of stealing, for instance, while engaged in
union solicitation or some other protected activity, it would apparently not
be possible for the employer to discharge him on that suspicion. If the
N.L.R.B. found as a matter of fact that the employee had not been stealing,
the employer would be required to reinstate, no matter how firm his conviction that the employee is a thief. Unable to introduce evidence of his
reasonable suspicions, an employer would be to some extent forced to
prove the employee's guilt, or take him back. While the language of the
instant case may represent an attitude that the discharge of an employee
engaged at the time in union activities is presumptively motivated by an
aversion to those activities, such an attitude is contrary to the requirement
that the N.L.R.B. has the burden of proof of actual discrimination. 12 The
court's language was unnecessary to reach the result in the instant case, but
if it is hereafter applied as a rule to other cases in which actual discrimination is not proved it will represent a significant retreat from the doctrine
that an employer may discharge employees for any reason so long as it is
not discriminatory.

TORTS-LIABILITY OF PROPERTY OWNER TO BURGLAR FOR INJURIES
CAUSED BY DYNAMITE "SPRING GUN" USED TO PROTECT WAREHOUSE-

Plaintiff broke a lock on the door of a warehouse adjacent to defendant's
coal mine and attempted to enter, with the admitted intention of stealing
property therein. By opening the door he set off a buried charge of dynamite which defendant had rigged to prevent recurrent breaking and enter11. The court cited (Instant case at 903 n.7) NLRB v. Hudson Motor Car Co.,
128 F.2d 529 (6th Cir. 1942) and NLRB v. Gluek Brewing Co., 144 F.2d 847 (8th
Cir. 1944), as an analogy to this result. In the Hudson Motor Car case the members
of the C.I.O. were disrupting production in the process of coercing employees who
were members of the A.F.L. to join the C.I.O. Employer, allegedly in order to
keep peace, discharged the A.F.L. members. The Board's finding of discrimination
was upheld because there was substantial evidence for the Board to find that employer's real reason was to favor the C.I.O., with which he had a contract, over the
A.F.L. The court, in the Hudson case specifically stated that even though the Board
could have drawn different inferences (i.e., that the real reason was employer's desire
to protect production) from the facts, it was not compelled to as long as the finding
it did make was supported by substantial evidence. The Glek case was similar. In
these cases the courts upheld the NLRB's findings because thes6 findings were supported by substantial evidence, not that discrimination was conclusive under the facts.
12. In NLRB v. Cincinnati Chemical Works, 144 F.2d 597 (6th Cir. 1944) employer allegedly discharged employee for making a disloyal statement in time of war.
The NLRB found that the employee had not made the statement in fact and ordered
reinstatement. The court reversed stating that from the evidence it was apparent
that the employee was discharged on employer's reasonable belief that he had made
the statement and not because the employee had been active in the union.
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ing of the building. Plaintiff brought an action for resulting permanent
injury to his feet. The trial court directed a verdict for the plaintiff, holding that as a matter of law defendant used excessive force to prevent the
breaking and entering of an uninhabited building, in that he employed a
dangerous instrumentality to inflict serious bodily injury upon the plaintiff without warning. Upon allowance of a motion to certify the record,
the Supreme Court of Ohio reversed the judgment, holding that defendant's "good faith" in his alleged belief that the device would not cause
injury, and whether he used more force than was reasonably necessary,
were questions for the jury. Allison v. Fiscus, 100 N.E.2d 237 (Ohio
1951).
The device employed in this case falls within the category of "spring
guns and traps," which have been a subject of litigation for more than a
century. In 1827 the use of any such device which might kill or inflict
serious bodily harm upon trespassers was prohibited in England by statute.I
In the United States, with the exception of one state,2 the setting of spring
guns to protect one's premises is not unlawful in itself.3 But the privilege
to defend property, like that of self-defense, is said to be limited to such
force as is reasonably necessary in view of the interest involved, exercised
only after a request to desist is ignored. 4 Thus it is consistently held
that a property owner who sets any mechanical device with the intent that
it shall kill or seriously injure a mere trespasser can claim no privilege if
death or injury results to such a trespasser.5 At least one eminent authority states as the accepted rule that, since the law places human safety
above property rights, the use of force calculated to cause death or serious
bodily injury is not privileged where only property is threatened. 6 However, statutes in some states specifically give the right to kill if necessary
to protect property, under various circumstances in which only property
is endangered. 7 And, beyond statutory considerations, it is frequently
stated in treatises that "the law justifies the taking of life when necessary
to prevent the commission of a felony." 8 It seems clear that this statement of- the law is too broad, especially in view of the many crimes now
1. 7 & 8 Gao. IV, c. 18 (1827).

An exception was made from sunrise to sunset

in defense of a dwelling.

2. Wisconsin. See Schmidt v. State, 159 Wis. 15, 18, 149 N.W. 388, 389 (1914).
3. WHART0 N, HOmicIDE 789 (3d ed. 1907) ; see, e.g., State v. Moore, 31 Conn. 479
(1863).
4. PRossER, ToRTs 131-133 (1941).
5. Bohlen and Burns, The Privilege to Protect Property by Dangerous Barriers
and Mechanical Devices, 35 YALE L.J. 525, 539 (1926).
6. PRossER, TORTS 133.
7. E.g., TEx. PEN. CoDa, Art. 1222, subd. 8 (Vernon, 1936) (killing to prevent
burglary or theft at night) ; ARiz. CODE ANN. c. 43, § 2908 (1939) (killing in defense
of property committed against one who manifestly intends or endeavors, by violence
or surprise, to commit a fel6ny) ; N.J. STAT. ANN. tit. 2, c. 138, § 6 (1939) (killing
any person attempting to commit burglary; burglary including "any building").
8. WARTON, HomIcDE 783 (3d ed. 1907); see BisHop, CRIMINAL LAW § 849
(9th ed. 1923) ; MILLER CRIMINAL LAW 258 (1934).
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made felonies by statute. 9 At any rate, there appears to be no uniform
rule of law as to what privilege, if any, exists to kill or inflict serious bodily
injury solely to protect property against a felonious entry.10 'In cases involving spring guns, with apparently only one exception, 1 the privilege has
been limited to protection of a dwelling,12 the courts reasoning that the
defendant in protecting his home would have been privileged to kill or
injure without warning, had he been present in person. 18 This limitation
in effect has restricted the privilege to use spring guns to situations where
life and limb of inhabitants are more likely to be endangered, perhaps for
the reason that such devices are incapable of exercising discretion in situations where the privilege might be questionable and where a human would
refrain from acting without warning. But, in applying the rule, several
cases have extended the meaning of dwelling to include unoccupied buildings where the possibility of physical danger could not be a factor. 14 In
one such case, Scheuernun v. Scharfenberg,'5 cited and relied upon to
some extent in the instant case, the Alabama court held that "a man's
place of business, as the defendant's store in this case, is pro hac vice his
dwelling, and he has the same right to defend it against entries such as
burglary as he has to protect his dwelling place." 16
The issue in the instant case was whether the defendant, acting by
a mechanical device, was privileged to set off two sticks of dynamite under
plaintiff's feet without first requesting him to desist. The trial court held
that this amounted to excessive force as a matter of law. The Ohio court
had held in State v. Childers17 that one may not use a spring gun to expel
an intruder where the property owner has no reasonable ground to fear
9. See Note, 25 Mic,. L. RE. 57, 59 (1926), and note 21 infra.
10. The uncertainty of the law is well stated in RESTATEMENT, TORTS, § 143, comment b, 1st caveat (1934) : "The Institute expresses no opinion as to whether there
is a privilege to use force. . . . upon another which is intended or likely to cause
death or serious bodily harm for the purpose of preventing a crime which involves
the breaking and entering of a building in which property of substantial value is stored
if such breaking and entering is by statute made a burglary or tantamount thereto."
11. Gray v. Combs, 7 3. J. Marsh. 478 (Ky. 1832) (a slave was shot while
feloniously breaking into a warehouse).
12. E.g., State v. Beckham, 306 Mo. 566, 267 S.W. 817 (1924) ; Pierce v. Commonwealth, 135 Va. 635, 115 S.E. 686 (1923). The same restriction was made an
exception in the English statute of 1827, .mpra note 1.
13. Apart from cases involving statutes making homicide justifiable if necessary to protect real property from intrusion, the weight of authority makes the use
of weapons or force dangerous to life and limb privileged only if the actor reasonably
believes that the threatened intrusion involves a danger to the life or limb of some
inmate of the dwelling place. PaossmR, ToRTs 134 (1941); see Bray v. State, 16
Ala. App. 433, 78 So. 463 (1918); State v. Patterson, 45 Vt. 308 (1873). Contra:
State v. Marfaudille, 48 Wash. 117, 92 Pac. 939 (1907).
14. E.g., United States v. Gilliam, 25 Fed. Cas. 1319, No. 15,205a (Grim. Ct. D.C.
1882) (chicken coop).
15. 163 Ala. 337, 50 So. 335 (1909).
16. Id. at 343, 50 So. at 337. In reaching this result the court seemed to rely
strongly on Jones v. State, 76 Ala. 8 (1884), which had held merely that a man attacked with deadly force in his store might stand his ground.
17. 133 Ohio St. 508, 14 N.E.2d 767 (1938). To same effect, see State v. Green,
118 S.C. 279, 110 S.E. 145 (1921).

19521

RECENT CASES

great bodily harm-a holding which conformed with the majority view
limiting the use of spring guns to defense of a dwelling. In the instant
case the court stated that it was applying the rule of the Childers case,
but found a distinction in the fact that the plaintiff there was a mere
trespasser, while here he was a felon by statute, engaged in the offense
of "breaking and entering." 18 Yet it is clear that in each case there was
equal lack of danger of bodily harm to the defendant. There is ample
authority for the distinction. 19 But, where the owner in protecting his
property is not personally endangered, it is difficult to see why infliction
of serious bodily injury should be to any extent privileged merely because
the act of the intruder is labelled a felony.20 The loose statutory use of
the term, frequently attacked by legal writers, 21 should logically preclude
22
attaching such importance in terms of legal rights to a mere word.
The effect of remanding to a jury the question of reasonableness of
the force used by defendant was to hold that there is a privilege to inflict
serious bodily injury if necessary to protect uninhabited isolated property
against felonious entry. This is contrary to the general rule in spring gun
cases, which, as noted above, has limited the privilege to defense of a
dwelling. But even if the court was correct in extending the privilege to
protection of a warehouse, the test applied here was whether the defendant
would have been privileged to inflict such injury had he been personally
present. By that test, it would seem clear that permanently injuring
the plaintiff's feet without warning amounted to the use of more force
than was necessary to prevent the felonious entry, and hence as a matter
of law the privilege was exceeded. This view was expressed by one member of the court in a strong dissenting opinion; reasonable men could not
differ as to whether this use of dynamite was excessive force.23 It appears
that no court has challenged the proposition followed here, that the property owner may do in absentia only that which he could do if personally
present.24 On the basis of this rule, it is submitted that the view of the
18. Oio GEN. CODE ANN. §§ 12442, 12372 (Page, 1938). Cf. N.Y. PEN. LAw
§ 404 (1909) ("burglary in third degree"); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 4901 (Purdon,
1939) ("burglary").
19. See note 8 supra.
20. This conception appears to be traceable to the early English principle that

where a capital felony was attempted by force, "it is lawful to repel that force by the
death of the party attempting." 4 BL Comm. *181. Since nearly all felonies were
capital, id. at *98, it has been suggested that a felon's death amounted only to a
slightly premature infliction of the penalty he had incurred by his crime. State v.
Barr, 11 Wash. 481, 487, 39 Pac. 1080, 1082 (1895). The invalidity of such rationalization now is obvious.
21. See, e.g., Longsdorf, Felmy-Archaic Word, 11 FED. BJ. 150 (1951);
Mikell, The Proposed Criminal Code of Pennsylvania, 71 U. oF PA. L. REv. 99
(1923).
22. Such practice has been termed "as vicious an exhibition of the bad effects of
the 'jurisprudence of conceptions' as can well be imagined." Bohlen and Burns, supra
note 5, at 540 n.44.
23. Judge Taft, 100 N.E.2d at 242-247.

24. See P~ossER, ToRTs 135 (1941) ; Holmes, J., in United Zinc Co. v. Britt, 258
U.S. 268, 275 (1922).
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dissenting judge as applied by the trial court in directing for the plaintiff
was correct, whether the result is founded on absence of privilege or an
excess of privilege as a matter of law. However, in those jurisdictions
which by statute or decision permit killing or severely injuring where
necessary to prevent burglary or other forceful felonious entries, it would
seem that the property owner may in certain circumstances do in absentia
that which he could not do if personally present. In a case such as this
one, the question would be left to the jury whether, to prevent breaking
and entering of his isolated property, the defendant necessarily had to rely
on a mechanical device. If defendant could show that conditions were
such that the device was necessary to prevent burglary, he would be
privileged. Though such analysis would seem to follow logically from the
law of privilege to kill or injure to prevent burglary as applied in some
states, it is to be hoped that the present rule continues to be exclusive.
The employment of dangerous mechanical devices, incapable as they are
of exercising discretion in any contingency, should in no way be condoned
by the courts. 25 The problems of property owners in protecting isolated
buildings and goods from burglary and theft are no doubt great. But,
as Judge Taft states in his dissenting opinion, "The public interest in preventing an unreasonable risk of unjustified injury to human beings certainly exceeds any interest which one may have in the protection of his
property not located either in or near his home."

TRUSTS-TOTTEN TRUSTS-RIGHTS OF THE SURVIVING SPOUSE UN-

DER THE ILLUSORY TRUST DOcTRINE-A deceased husband, fifteen months

prior to his death, had opened four savings bank accounts in his own name
in trust for his infant grandchild. The widow-executrix, who was the
sole beneficiary of the will of her husband, sought by discovery proceedings
to bring the bank accounts into the estate of her husband. The Surrogate
held that all the transfers were illusory and that consequently the proceeds of all the accounts were the property of the estate.' The Appellate
Division of the Supreme Court modified, validating the bank accounts in
trust with respect to sums remaining after deduction of the amount guaranteed to the widow by the Decedent Estate Law.2 In reviewing this
decision, the New York Court of Appeals upheld the total validity of the
trusts, although the widow could thereby be deprived of her intestate
share, but the order of the lower court was affirmed since the infant bene25. As a matter of policy, it might well be questioned whether an absolute liability
should not be imposed by legislation on persons using such devices, at least in circumstances where innocent persons are likely to be injured.
1. Matter of Halpern, 197 Misc. 502, 96 N.Y.S.2d 596 (Surr. Ct. 1950), 25 N.Y.U.
L.Q. Rsv. 920.
2. Matter of Halpern, 277 App. Div. 525, 100 N.Y.S.2d 894 (1st Dep't 1950), 15
ALB. L. REv. 254 (1951).
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ficiary had not appealed. Matter of Halpern, 303 N. Y. 33, 100 N. E. 2d

120 (1951).
The instant case serves to remove some of the uncertainty concerning
the status of Totten trusts in New York when they operate to defeat the
expectancy of the widow,3 and also indicates some of the tests to be applied
in other situations in order to determine whether a trust will be held
illusory. A Totten trust is created by making a savings bank deposit in
the name of the depositor as trustee for another.4 Such deposits are
frequently called tentative trusts or savings-deposit trusts. If the depositor
has not at the time of the deposit or subsequently manifested an intention
that the trust be irrevocable, he can revoke it in whole or in part by words
or conduct which indicate an intent to revoke.5 The intention of the
depositor is determinative in passing upon the effect of a savings bank
deposit in trust for another. In the absence of any evidence of the intention of the depositor, aside from the form of the deposit, some courts will
infer an irrevocable trust,6 others infer no trust at all,7 while most courts
will find that a tentative trust is intended.8 The depositor can revoke by
means of a will,9 or by withdrawal.' 0 Nevertheless, a depositor has been
denied the right to set off the deposit against the claim of an insolvent
bank." It has been held that creditors of the depositor are entitled to
reach the deposit during his lifetime,' 2 or at his death.' 3 If the beneficiary
predeceases the depositor, the trust is automatically revoked.' 4 However,
if the depositor becomes insane, his guardian cannot revoke the trust unless necessary for the welfare of the depositor.' 5 In determining the
validity of a Totten trust, the principal case makes it clear that worthiness
3. See Niles, Trusts and Administration, 25 N.Y.U.L.Q. REv. 920 (1950).
4. Matter of Totten, 179 N.Y. 112, 71 N.E. 748 (1904) (The Totten trust took
its name from this case which pronounced the legal effect of such a trust).
5. McKeever v. Empire Trust Co., 270 N.Y. Supp. 494 (N.Y. Munic. Ct. 1934).
6. Rose v. Osborne, 133 Me. 497, 180 Atl. 315 (1935).
7. Mulloy v. Charlestown Five Cents Savings Bank, 285 Mass. 101, 188 N.E. 608
(1934) (In Massachusetts the depositor is required to communicate his intention).
Thatcher v. Trenton Trust Co., 119 N.J. Eq. 408, 182 Atl. 912 (1936) (Totten
trusts are held to be testamentary and invalid in New Jersey).
8. E.g., Scanlon's Estate, 313 Pa. 424, 169 At. 106 (1933). See note 22 infra
and text for current Pennsylvania position.
9. A general residuary clause which disregarded the Totten trust beneficiary was
held to be an effective disaffirmance of the tentative trust. Morris v. Sheehan, 234
N.Y. 366, 138 N.E. 23 (1922); however, a bequest of the residue does not in itself
revoke the trust but may have that effect along with other acts and words. A revocation must be express. A will containing a general clause of revocation or a residuary
clause does not ipso facto revoke a tentative trust. Pozzuto's Estate, 124 Pa. Super.
93 (1936), 85 U. oF PA. L. Rav. 646 (1937).
10. Matter of Slobiansky, 152 Misc. 232, 273 N.Y. Supp. 869 (Surr. Ct. 1934).
11. Kardon v. Willing, 20 F. Supp. 471 (E.D. Pa. 1937), 86 U. oF PA. L. Rrv.
321 (1938).
12. Banca D'Italia & Trust Co. v.- Giordano, 154 Pa. Super. 452 (1943).
13. Matter of Weinberg, 162 Misc. 867, 296 N.Y. Supp. 7 (Surr. Ct. 1937).
14. Collopy's Estate, 33 Pa. D.&C. 169 (1938) ; McWilliams' Estate, 38 Pa. D.&C.
93 (1940), 88 U. oF PA. L. R-v. 886 (Savings account remained part of the
estate of the depositor, where the depositor and the beneficiary died simultaneously).
15. Matter of Rassmussen, 147 Misc. 564, 264 N.Y. Supp. 231 (Surr. Ct. 1933).

610

UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 100

of motive is not a factor, the only requirement being a good faith divestment of ownership of the property by the depositor. The good faith required pertains to the authenticity of the divestment, and not to the motive
of the deceased in making the transfer. A trust will not be held to be

unreal merely because it operates, or is indeed intended, to defeat the
expectancy of a surviving spouse.
A widow cannot be deprived of her statutory share by will, as the
statutes allow her to take against the will,16 but she is given no rights in
property disposed of by means of absolute inter vivos transfers. 17 At
common law the doctrine of "fraud on the marital right" was used to
inquire into the validity of transfers which operated as a detriment to the
wife's expectancy.' 8 A finding of actual fraud or that the attempted destruction of the widow's share was mere sham or pretense, was needed to
set aside a transfer at common law. A similar doctrine seems to have
been applied in the situation where the widow is deprived of her statutory
share by the creation of Totten trusts. These transfers may be held invalid as illusory. The test for validity as set forth by Mr. Justice Holmes
is to determine whether "from the technical point of view such a conveyance does not take back all that it gives, but practically it does." 19 While
the court in the instant case purported to follow the illusory trust doctrine
as set forth in the case of Newman v. Dore,20 it is difficult to reconcile the
opinion in the instant case, which says that § 18 of the Decedent Estate
Act does not affect inter vivos dispositions of property, with the insinuation in the Newman case that § 18 would invalidate an otherwise valid
trust. It is clear that there have been a good many misconceptions of just
what the illusory trust doctrine is, as applied to Totten trusts in New York.
The doctrine as announced in the principal case is inconsistent with
the law as set forth in the Restatement of Trusts and applied in Pennsylvania. A Pennsylvania court has held that a tentative trust is ineffective
with regard to the surviving spouse. 2 1 That court felt bound to so hold
by the policy of the Estates Act of 1947 22 and a new comment in the
16. In re Cramm's Estate, 329 Pa. 528, 198 Atl. 653 (1938).
17. Beirne v. Continental-Equitable Title & Trust Co., 307 Pa. 570, 161 Atl. 721
(1932).
18. See Bregy and Wilkinson, Antenuptial Transfers as Frauds on Marital Rights
in Pennsylvania, 90 U. OF PA. L. REv. 62 (1941).
19. Leonard v. Leonard, 181 Mass. 458, 461, 63 N.E. 1068, 1071 (1902) (A deed
of real estate, made by a husband mainly for the purpose of depriving his wife of her
statutory share in his estate, but also given in consideration of care bestowed and to
be bestowed upon the grantor, was held valid against the grantor's widow).
20. In that case trust agreements executed by the husband, transferring to trustees all of his property with reservations of right to revoke at will, right to the entire
income during life, and right to control the powers of the trustees during his life
were held to be illusory conveyances and unlawful invasions of the wife's rights under
the Decedent Estate Law. The case did not decide whether the reservation of the
income or power of revocation without power of control would be sufficient to invalidate the trust. 275 N.Y. 371, 9 N.E.2d 966 (1937).
21. Black Estate, 73 Pa. D.&C. 86 (1950).
22. "A conveyance of assets by a person who retains a power of appointment by
will, or a power of revocation or consumption over the principal thereof, shall at the
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Restatenment of Trusts which states that ". ..

the surviving spouse of a

person who makes a savings deposit upon a tentative trust can reach the
deposit." 2 3 In the instant opinion the New York court states categorically

that there is nothing illusory about a Totten trust as such and prior cases
holding tentative trusts invalid were based on factual showings of unreality. 24 Actually the illusory trust is a contradiction in terms, for such
a transfer is no trust at all. Therefore the entire transfer must be void
and not only that part which is equal to the statutory share of the widow.
The court in the principal case has resolved the conflicting economic and
socio-legal interests in favor of preserving the Totten trust as a simple, inexpensive, and readily available trust device. This may result, in certain
cases, in the putting to rout of the policy of the legislature in providing
for a statutory share for the surviving spouse. Distortions of trust law
should not, however, be made the means by which the legislative policy
is best served. 25 It should be done by specific legislation.
election of his surviving spouse, be treated as a testamentary disposition so far as the
surviving spouse is concerned to the extent to which the power has been reserved, but
the right of the surviving spouse shall be subject to the rights of any income beneficiary whose interest in income becomes vested in enjoyment prior to the death of the
conveyor." PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 20, §301.11 (Purdon 1950). The commissioners
comment to this section indicates that the preservation of the right of the surviving
spouse, where the decedent had retained important rights of ownership, was intended
to change existing case law. In BREGY, INTESTATE, WILLS AND ESTATE AcTs OF 1947
5859 (1947) it is stated ".
. situations where an inter vivos transfer of personalty
might be regarded as testamentary as to the surviving spouse even without the aid of
the present act are tentative trusts. . . No Pennsylvania appellate court case passmg on the rights of the surviving spouse with regard to such transactions has been
found. It would seem reasonable to suppose, however, that such property would be
available to the spouse on the analogy of cases holding that such transfers are testamentary as to creditors."
23. RESTATEMNT, TRUSTS § 58, comment cc. (Supp. 1948).
24. See Krause v. Krause, 285 N.Y. 27, 32 N.E.2d 779 (1941) (The lower court
had awarded the widow a one-third share of the trust, the proper amount under the
statute. The Court of Appeals disapproved of this award but solely on the ground
that the will had not yet been probated); Burns v. Turnbull, 37 N.Y.S.2d 380 (Sup.
Ct. 1942), rev'd mere., 266 App. Div. 779, 41 N.Y.S.2d 448 (2d Dep't 1943), motion
for reargument granted without opinion, 267 App. Div. 986, 48 N.Y.S.2d 453 (2d
Dep't 1944), appeal from motion,denied without opinion, 294 N.Y. 809, 62 N.E.2d 270
(1945), aff'd on reargument inem., 268 App. Div. 822, 49 N.Y.S.2d 538 (2d Dep't
1945), aff'd without opinion, 294 N.Y. 889, 62 N.E.2d 785 (1945) (The Court of
Appeals affirmed the Appellate Division's reversal of a finding by the trial court that
the trust was a valid inter vivos disposition of property).
25. "The most desirable result can, undoubtedly, only be attained by legislative
enactment. The New York rule on tenative trusts and joint bank accounts would be
an adequate foundation for such legislation, but even this liberal rule needs extension
if any uniformity is ever to be attained". Note, Testamentary Uses of Bank Accounts,
81 U. OF PA. L. REv. 737, 746 (1933).

